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Abstract
Authenticating a user’s identity lies at the heart of securing any information system.
A trade off exists currently between user experience and the level of security the system
abides by. Using Continuous and Implicit Authentication a user’s identity can be verified
without any active participation, hence increasing the level of security, given the continuous
verification aspect, as well as the user experience, given its implicit nature.
This thesis studies using mobile devices inertial sensors data to identify unique move-
ments and patterns that identify the owner of the device at all times. We implement,
and evaluate approaches proposed in related works as well as novel approaches based on a
variety of machine learning models, specifically a new kind of Auto Encoder (AE) named
Variational Auto Encoder (VAE), relating to the generative models family. We evaluate
numerous machine learning models for the anomaly detection or outlier detection case of
spotting a malicious user, or an unauthorised entity currently using the smartphone sys-
tem. We evaluate the results under conditions similar to other works as well as under
conditions typically observed in real-world applications. We find that the shallow VAE
is the best performer semi-supervised anomaly detector in our evaluations and hence the
most suitable for the design proposed.
The thesis concludes with recommendations for the enhancement of the system and
the research body dedicated to the domain of Continuous and Implicit Authentication for
mobile security.
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It is forecasted that there will be 17.72 billion mobile devices worldwide by 2024, and with
5G and 6G technologies on top of their personal computer (PC)-like computing resources,
they will be more capable than ever [21]. As mobile devices are growing in numbers and
capabilities by the day, they will be the main way humans interact with information tech-
nologies, given their portability and similarity to PCs. Nowadays, in our hyper-connected
world, mobile devices are closer to the user, as well as their critical access and sensitive
data, than any other class of electronics. It is of pivotal importance to properly authenti-
cate (i.e., validate the legitimacy of) every passive or active session of the mobile device in
an effective manner to eliminate the risk of breaching the user’s and the device’s security.
This needs to be done within a high level of convenience to the human using the device to
mitigate workarounds (e.g., : passwords sticky notes).
A variety of risks arise due to that very portability that makes these devices extremely
convenient, and efficient tools for human technology usage, to the extent of outselling PCs
for years [22]. These risks include the possibility of the devices getting stolen, lost, or
misplaced easily, which would allow unauthorized personnel to run various sophisticated
physical and cyber attacks on them, leading to an abundance of mobile security breaches.
The impact of a mobile security breach is in most times more severe than that of a PC
breach, as mobile devices hold just as many credentials, photos, and data as the PC, but
additionally contain calls data, locations information, a popular second factor of authenti-
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cation, such as One Time Password (OTP) offline generators or text Short Message Service
(SMS) based OTP, used in many services nowadays and more [22].
1.1 Access Management
Authorization systems are mainly constructed around challenges of what the users are,
have, do, or know, and more recently something relating to their context or situation [23].
This allows the user to prove their identity to the system and their eligibility and enti-
tlements to certain actions and data. They have been evolving in implementations, but
generally, these are the five authentication factors used nowadays and examples of their
implementations:
• something the user knows (e.g., password, pattern, PIN, secret question-answer)
• something the user has (e.g., USB token, smart-card, software token, cookie)
• something the user is (e.g., fingerprint, DNA fragment, iris pattern, voice pattern,
hand geometry, heart rhythm)
• something the user does (e.g., signature, gesture, handwriting, walk)
• something about the user (e.g., current timezone, current location or position, current
date and time, spatio-temporal authentication, reputation or web of trust, Turing test
or Captcha to test whether the user is as capable or human as we assume, contextual
or situational awareness)
These are the authentication factors mainly utilized, and generally, authentication sys-
tems are considered more robust if they use more factors (i.e., Multi-Factor Authentication
(MFA)). For instance, most two-factor authentication systems utilize a password, some-
thing the user knows, as well as a one-time passphrase sent to the user’s phone, something
the user has. A benefit of the OTP mechanism is its resiliency to replay attacks, as the
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code is regenerated for every use case [23]. The most common of these authentication fac-
tors is the user knows authentication factor, which is commonly implemented in a shared
secret ID and password fashion across our technological landscape today.
Continuous authentication refers to a mechanism where the authentication factor is
being monitored continuously to assess the legitimacy of the user access repeatedly instead
of more common one-time authentication systems (e.g., phone only asks for a password
when unlocking the screen). The frequency of these challenges or checks is to be minimized
to shorten the period where an attacker can slip under the radar undetected, sometimes to
a few seconds. Implicit authentication refers to authentication that can occur without the
user of the system actively participating or even gaining knowledge of it, hence happening
passively under the hood. Implicit authentication is commonly deployed continuously, as
well, to check the security posture frequently since it does not have to undermine system
convenience in the pursuit of tighter security. Continuous and Implicit Authentication
(CIA) systems might be a great authentication factor, next to something the user knows
(e.g., PIN, password) for the mobile security use case. We evaluate that further in our
work later on in this thesis.
A few questions that arise in our work are: How can we enhance mobile device secu-
rity using breakthrough technologies like generative models that have appeared recently
in the machine learning research domain? Is it possible to find a good balance between
convenience and security and address both physical and cyber threats? How can a system
continuously and implicitly collect data passively and use unique patterns to identify au-
thorized users? Can we leverage the increasing computational power available to mobile
devices and cloud technologies to enable a powerful security system? We take on all of
these questions and delve deeper into this work to find a solution.
1.2 Continuous and Implicit Authentication
The basis of our solution, the Continuous and Implicit Authentication system, is the utiliza-
tion of data streams continuously available on the phone at all times, including nonactive
usage, and run it by an anomaly detection module for the sake of detecting an imposter,
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conveniently without alerting the user to the process of validating their identity.
Imagine a phone theft occurs, and the phone can identify within seconds that the new
holder is an imposter, and encrypts all its data safely, and alert authorities. Alternatively,
the original user walks to their smart home or smart car, and everything unlocks automat-
ically because the phone in the user’s pocket can identify and authorize the person. This
is the objective of this solution and its domain, and our contributions are a step in the
right direction, making this objective more feasible, efficient, cheaper, and more probable
for the near future.
1.3 Contributions
Our contributions in this work can be summarized as:
• Present a thorough review of motivations, threat models, and use cases in the con-
tinuous and implicit authentication domain
• Present a thorough review of existing works
• Present a thorough proposal and review of generative models capabilities for the
continuous and implicit authentication use case, especially when using human kine-
matics
• Evaluate light machine learning models and compared them to the generative model
proposed and the state of the art deep learning-based solution
• Find the proposed generative model to be lighter, faster, more accurate, and resilient
than all other solutions, including state of the art
• Present a thorough mobile security collaborative architecture proposal for the solu-
tion around the proposed outlier detection generative model, in which edge and cloud
training, real-time responses, and third party integrations can take place
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• Utilized high availability and low privacy and power inertial data available on most
smartphones for our work to allow for better convenience and eliminate the need
for active usage of the device to enable authentication (non-cooperative and non-
intrusive)
• Propose a new experiment setting that mimics real-world scenarios often overlooked
by other researchers, which lowered performance metrics for all solutions but kept
the generative model at the top
• Run extensive evaluations on the most popular public dataset in the domain with
multiple experiment settings and machine learning models
• Implement the proposed solution core generative model and a data collection and
real-time streaming application for Android and IOS systems.
• Open-source all processing modules, experiments, implementations, and mobile op-
erating systems to enhance reproducibility and shorten development cycles for other
researchers
The purpose of our work in this thesis is to assess the reliability and feasibility of a
CIA system that could potentially enhance mobile security while maintaining high levels
of privacy and convenience for the users. We aim to deliver maximum convenience hand in
hand with security instead of selecting a point on the trade-off, using emerging technologies
and techniques. To deliver maximum convenience and privacy within the mobile CIA
system context, we limit our data to inertial sensors data (accelerometer, gyroscope, and
magnetometer), as they are also continuously available whether the device is being actively
used or not. We also limit our work to light machine learning models to perform anomaly
or outlier detection evaluations to be trained and deployed on the phone continuously. We
document threat models and use cases that have developed recently and affected all mobile
device users. We evaluate how a CIA system can work with and collaborate with other
third-party security products and processes in place to improve and simplify the overall
security posture of the users, more on that in Chapter 2.
A significant component of our work is tailored towards utilizing generative models,
more on our approach in Chapter 4, and specifically the new Variational Auto Encoder, as
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a fast, reliable, convenient, and light anomaly detector to fit within our CIA system. We
evaluate it against other common algorithms in numerous hyperparameter settings combi-
nations across various experiment settings that covered optional deep feature extractions,
extra data features, data scalings, and more. We then demonstrate that generative models
also outperform other models in experiments that mimicked real-life scenarios instead of
lab setups.
We base some of our work and evaluations on the HMOG dataset [24] and the promising
results published by Centeno et al. [20] and re-implemented by Buech [13]. We elaborate
on our extensive evaluations in Chapter 5, where we run more than ten different anomaly
and outlier detection algorithms. We propose an experiment setting uncommon in today’s
literature that mimics real-life use cases and finds that it deeply hinders reported state-of-
the-art metrics, commonly reported in the domain, including our generative models-based
results. We also document the implementations and engineering we put into the solution
for ease of reproducibility in Chapter 6.
We contribute to the relevant research domains, carefully reviewed in the Chapter 3,
extensive open-source evaluations, methods to annihilate the need for manual feature en-
gineering other than deep learning, a detailed methodology in architecting the solution,
implementation of data collection, and real-time streaming, mobile application, and im-
plementation of the proposed Variational Auto Encoder for the Android and IOS mobile
operating systems. To allow other researchers to understand our contributions, we make
our results comparable to most existing works by utilizing the most common performance
metrics, dataset, and data processing techniques.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we discuss findings, propose questions, and highlight future op-




This chapter explains the domain of our work and describes the concept, threat models
incorporated in our design, use cases, contextual awareness, threat response, performance
metrics, and data types.
2.1 Concept
Our work investigates the problem of outlier detection to spot unauthorized users of a
mobile device implicitly based on how they handle the device at any particular time. By
handling the device, the user leaves behind a trace of unique movements to them, based
on the idiosyncrasy of their habits, hand measurements, and natural range of motion while
typing or using the device. The movements are captured by the inertial phone sensors:
accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer. Assuming that a limited number of users
use the smartphone, most commonly, the idea is to trigger when the activity in the session
(any particular minute in our case) seems to be off the standard behavior. Standard
behavior in this context is defined by the owner or authorized user’s behavior saved during
a pre-determined duration, where multiple scenarios are performed and measured.
Although the most commonly used biometrics are physiological (like face, fingerprint,






Submit identifying traces for the AI to
train on and set the normal behavior
expected for the legitimate users. 
Authentication
The Continuous and Implicit Authentication
is in its active service mode. Infractions are
reported and dealt with according to
policies set. Users can use their phones
normally.Updating
Every set period of time (ex: 1 month)
the users can update their identifying
traces and behaviors.
Figure 2.1: Logical stages of the system in deployment.
are more fitting to Continuous and Implicit Authentication and hence are more resilient
to the owner being forced or tricked to hand over their authenticated device.
In a real-world deployment of this solution, the following three fundamental stages
need to be considered: (i) enrollment, (ii) authentication (iii) updating. These stages are
explained in more detail below and can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Enrollment is generally a very simple scenario involving inertial data collection where
the user is presented with certain activities to conduct (e.g., using the phone while sitting,
using the phone while walking, using the phone while standing, using the phone while
running, using the phone while biking, and using the phone while driving). As the user
acts out the activities, the data from the inertial sensors are ingested and streamed to the
AI module to be utilized as training data for this user’s profile. The users can register













IF training is needed
Model Download
Figure 2.2: System architecture, showing the training taking place on a cloud resource.
The model is internally evaluated against a pre-determined set of malicious data and a
threshold is set for acceptance in a functional testing sub-stage. If the model passes, the
model is ready to get out of enrollment and graduate to the next stage. If the model does
not pass, then the enrollment is determined not good enough and the user is asked to redo
the activities.
The next stage of the deployment is authentication. This is when the core activities of
the solution take place, which is detecting deviations from normal behavior and responding
according to a set policy that sets sensitivity thresholds. Responses might include notifying
local authorities or hiding sensitive apps and data from the current session’s user until the
user performs a secret bypass pattern to restore the device to its normal state. This stage
is where the solution is designed to be most of the deployment life cycle. Suppose the user
is falsely classified as malicious, and their sensitive data and apps are being hidden from
view. In this case, the user can either initiate an updating stage transition to enhance the
model’s performance by proving they are legitimate users by entering a special secret bypass
pattern of movements or taps and then updating the profile by acting out new training
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scenarios, or the user can enter the secret bypass pattern to make an exception and cancel
responses for the current session. The bypass pattern can take the form of any set of
events. For instance, tapping the top right corner of the screen five times and then tapping
the bottom left corner two times or both corners simultaneously three times. The secret
bypass pattern allows the user to have a way to authenticate if the system has reasonable
suspicion against the current session as a fallback. We advise against utilizing the secret
bypass pattern frequently, and hence the system can enforce a series of authentication
challenges and an update stage transition if the secret bypass pattern is utilized with high
frequency and is abused.
Occasionally, the updating stage will be initiated as scheduled or in an active learn-
ing setting via immediate feedback. It is recommended to schedule monthly or quarterly
updating sessions for the system to learn new behaviors that the users have adopted, con-
sciously or subconsciously. The sessions are similar to enrollment from user experience,
but only the deviations are recorded and reflect certain changes on the user profile normal
behavior model. As this stage might present an attack surface, this stage is only enabled
after other authentication factors are passed (e.g., password, PIN, face recognition, finger-
print, keystroke dynamics). Immediate feedback can be set to achieve an active learning
setup where the model can get feedback on its detections in near real-time by the user just











Figure 2.3: System architecture, showing the training taking place on the smartphone.
10
It is important to note that during our design, we consider two cases, as per Figure 2.2
and Figure 2.3, for model training (1) at edge training and (2) at cloud training, but we
always fixed inference at the edge since the threat models indicated the possibility of losing
connection to the internet at critical times, stressing the need for an always-on and always
alert continuous and implicit authentication system. The edge of the phone, in this case,
might or might not run training, depending on preference, compatibility, and capabilities.
The compatibility and capabilities explored by us are further detailed in the Chapter 6.
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2.2 Threat Models
In this section, we build on the concept put forward in the previous section, and quantify
the threat models endangering mobile users’ security today.
The four threat models we are considering feature the device being used by someone
else other than the owner. The ability to detect an unauthorized user implicitly and
continuously allows us to offer protection against the loss of sensitive and private data. The
owner or authorized users are the devices able to choose which data or device functionalities
are considered sensitive.
The scenario is defined as the threat actor gaining physical access to the device, as
well as bypassing the initial authentication system (e.g., PIN, fingerprint, Face ID) by
any means. This may include previous possession, negligence, software bugs, brute-force
attacks, dictionary attacks, or even acquiring the device and credentials by force.
The sensitive information and access available to the unauthorized user in this situation
includes but is not limited to:
• Personally identifiable information (PII): e.g., address, date of birth, name, initials,
signature, pictures
• Critical information: e.g., passwords in a password manager, intellectual property, trade
secrets, personal secrets, strategy, business plans
• Critical access: e.g., valuable assets, digital currency, bank accounts, infrastructure,
email accounts, social media accounts, private keys
The threat model can take a few different forms and variants. In Table 2.1, the follow-
ing specific threat models are described: threat model (A), Compromised authentication
factor, is where an unauthorized user is able to use the correct PIN, password, pattern,
or biometrics to log in due to prior knowledge (e.g., by-shoulder surfing the legitimate
user previously logging in). Threat model (B), Handover/Sharing, is when the authorized
user hands over their device, unlocked, to an authority figure, friend, or spouse. Threat
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Threat Models
Label Name Description Example
A Compromised Compromised authentication factor
leading to successful bypass of other
authentication factors by a threat ac-
tor
Unauthorized user is able to
enter the correct PIN, pass-
word, or pattern to login
to the device and act mali-
ciously inheriting the priv-
ileges of the compromised
credential’s user.
B Handover Authorized user handing over or shar-
ing their device with someone unau-
thorized
Owner giving their unlocked
device to an authority fig-
ure, attacker forcing login,
friend, or spouse. The
unauthorized actor is able
to act maliciously with the
same privileges the autho-
rized user has.
C Unattended Authorized user leaves phone un-
locked and unattended, resulting in
theft or unauthorized access
Owner forgets device on the
table, and leaves the room.
A threat actor picks it up
and is able to act mali-
ciously with the same priv-




Locked device is lost Owner gets pick-pocketed
while walking. A threat ac-
tor has access to the device
in its locked state.
Table 2.1: Threat models considered
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model (C) is when an authorized user forgets their device, is unlocked, on a table, and
leaves the room. A threat actor then picks it up and is able to act maliciously with the
same privileges the authorized user has. Lastly, a fourth and important threat model is
(D), and it does not depend on the active usage of the phone at all. Instead, it focuses on
the passive phone authentication state, meaning that the device loss can be detected when
the phone is unlocked by capturing moves the phone registers while locked in the hands,
pockets, or bag of someone else.
2.2.1 Use Cases Scenarios
Compromised Authentication System
Threat model (A) (cf., Table 2.1) is when a phone is physically with someone else that has
compromised the authentication procedure. In this case, they do not need you to leave the
phone unlocked behind or give it to them unlocked, as they can unlock it as many times as
they want by knowing how to bypass the primary authentication. That is, by obtaining the
means of submitting the correct answer to the authentication system (e.g., fingerprint,
password, PIN, pattern, biometrics) or being able to exploit a software vulnerability to
bypass the authentication system used to protect the phone.
In the case described above, the only security system left to protect the phone is one
that can detect deviating behavior from the normal (associated with the real owner) and
be discrete, implicit, and continuous in its detecting fashion, as well as being subtle in
its response to that detection. We do not tackle the response procedure in this work
very deeply, but we are very interested in detecting the threat models as accurately as
possible and minimizing the false positives to ensure convenience is not heavily sacrificed
for security. Cases where we can see threat model (A) play are when a colleague shoulder
surfs you entering the PIN and using that later when you are not around to access sensitive
information. Within a minute, the system can pick up the new behavior solely based on
inertial sensors data and the way the co-worker handles the phone and subtly disable access
to important data.
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Handing over an Authenticated Device
There are many examples around the second threat model (B), specifically by handovers
to government officials, which has spiked in the past few years. In some of these cases,
customs and border officers would ask for the smartphone of the people going through
the border or checkpoints to view their receipts, purchases, contacts, text messages, social
media, or emails. The digital search is conducted without a need for a warrant, much like
the physical luggage search, during a border crossing.
The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) says it is allowed to search cell phones,
smartphones, computers, tablets, removable media, drives, cameras, smartwatches, and
any other digital device. The search is said to be to address concerns for reasons as broad
as the admissibility of goods, identity confirmation, breaking laws or regulations, among
others. The CBSA says that the officer will ask the person to write their password on a
piece of paper and that they are obligated to provide the password when asked. The CBSA
goes on and indicates that failure to grant access to the device will result in detention of
the device under section 101 of the Customs Act or seizure of the digital device under
subsection 140(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The use case is further
documented and reads that the office will put the phone on airplane mode, hence disabling
any internet-based security systems, meaning that a security system to detect this action
needs to be able to process the data locally at all times. [25]
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Pro-
tection (CBP) also has customs and procedures involving the search of all electronic devices
at any border crossing. CBP has published a directive [26] on electronic devices border
searches in which it is indicated that the authorities are allowed to search devices such as
portable computers, tablets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones, and other communication
devices, cameras, music players, and other media players. The directive says the officers
will disable the network connectivity and will conduct a search, with or without suspicion
of their contents. This behavior can be detected if a security system that performs im-
plicit and continuous authentication is running locally without the need for an internet
connection.
In this use case, once the behavior is detected by handling the phone differently for one
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minute, after which the operating system can hide certain data and applications automat-
ically until a specific secret authorization step is performed, for example, tapping the top
right corner of the screen five times.
Threat model (B) can also take the form of a forced login by a criminal motivated to
access and transfer financial assets such as digital currencies or valuable business or political
information they can sell to news media, competitors, and traders. Figure 2.4 shows how
this system will be able to hide data and apps, which might even save human lives in
certain circumstances. Even if the phone was unlocked and authenticated, anomalous user
behavior before and during the primary authentication is noticed by the device. As we
mention later in this chapter, context can be very useful, as it gives our module information
about location or time. For instance, the system can be set to hide access to your Bitcoin
wallet when the user is passing a small isolated street during a vacation abroad. Moreover,
the system can hide access to the user’s confidential emails, files, and apps when passing
through border control.
Threat model (B) also happens in many social scenarios when you would like a friend,
spouse, or colleague to view your screen momentarily, and they decide to take the liberty
and use your phone in their possession for something else.
Misplacing an Authenticated Device
Threat model (C) has a variety of use cases, most popular of which is when a user leaves the
phone for a nearby opportunistic threat actor. The phone can be left behind intentionally
or unintentionally, but it is exposed to theft or unauthorized access from nearby individuals.
In this use case, for instance, a spouse or friend can take control of the phone when it is
left unlocked on a coffee table and explore the contents, either maliciously or not. Within
a minute, the phone detects the new user and triggers an action plan like hiding data or
applications or simply forcing a reboot or lockout.
In case of theft, the use case would be easily detected and differentiated from the spouse
use case by context, and using heuristics or rules sets of common post-theft patterns (e.g.,
throwing SIM card away, logging out of accounts), which is something our solution can be







Continuous & Implicit 
Authentication System
Forced Login
Figure 2.4: An example forced login scenario, showing how the proposed system can hide data, and apps on the phone to
prevent losses and damages.
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out of their Google or Apple account and the SIM card is removed, trigger theft procedure,
assuming different inertial behavior is detected as well.
Locked Device Loss
Threat model (D) focuses on the passive use of the phone to alert the owner and their
enterprise of a lost or stolen device. This can work hand-in-hand with the ”find my device“
capability that most modern smartphones today have. Notice that by having the system
running while the phone is not used actively, the system can act as an authenticator itself.
For instance, it can go as far as sending an authentication token for integrated systems
like smart cars, smart gates, or smart homes.
We consider all four threat models defined and aim to design a solution to protect the
user in all of these use cases.
2.3 Contextual Awareness
In this section, we build on the concept and threat models put forward in the previous
sections, and propose the utilization of contextual awareness to better the understanding
and sense of the environment and the situation at any given moment before taking action
against a detected threat.
The Continuous and Implicit Authentication System, also referred to as the solution can
interact with other modules that can provide further contextual and situational awareness
to the model. We have not been able to test that in our evaluations for the lack of an
appropriate dataset. However, there are strong reasons to believe that situational awareness
can play a significant role in most use cases.
For instance, we can simply define context as the location of the device. If the device is
at a border or a police station, the system can be set to go in high alert mode and disable
the profile updating stage functionality or disable high-profile functionalities temporarily.
The system can only allow low-profile data and applications or display customized mock
interfaces and pages to unauthorized users. This is useful for preventing suspicion by the
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threat actor, who can accuse the legitimate user of non-compliance in the scenario where
they are law enforcement authorities.
Context can also be set not only by geographical location but also by neighboring de-
vices or beacons that give our solution a feeling of trust and security when the device is at a
virtual home, that can be pre-set as a safe zone [27]. The safe zone can be identified based
on certain smart home or Internet of Things enabled electronics such as TVs, displays,
speakers, virtual assistants, power outlets, cameras, doorbells, baby monitors, home secu-
rity systems, thermostats, lighting systems, kitchen appliances, home cleaning electronics,
fitness devices, lawnmowers, sprinkling systems, smart luggage, or smart car. Alterna-
tively, detection of the safe zone can be based on the electronics on the user at most times
like personal electronics such as tablets or laptops or smart gadgets such as smartwatch
watches, fitness tracker, or headphones. Devices such as telehealth and telemedicine smart
wearables, pacemakers, insulin pumps, blood sugar monitors, shoe inserts, necklaces, ECG
and EEG monitors, RFID implants, or smart tattoos are also good indicators of a safe
environment.
Many mobile and WiFi sensing works have been able to show successful results in indoor
localization, people counting [28], activity classification, health monitoring, humidity esti-
mation, sign language recognition, metal detection, smoking detection, traffic monitoring,
sleep detection, gesture recognition, emotion recognition, attention monitoring, keystrokes
recognition, drawing in the air, and more [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
42, 43, 32].
We envision integrations that enable the detection of a forced login by also checking
for rising skin temperature, rising heartbeat rate, or negative emotions. The integrations
open up a wide range of possibilities for the use cases in Table 2.1. These indicators can
be leveraged via the use of other features, gadgets, and models.
An integration with an Enterprise Mobile Management (EMM) system will also prove
pivotal, as notable alerts can be forwarded to the EMM and hence can reach the corporate
Security Operations Center (SOC), correlated and analyzed by security analysts and via
a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) as well as responded to in the
appropriate manner. EMM systems are able to integrate with a Virtual Private Network
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(VPN) and mobile threat defense systems, to name a few, and are commonly tasked with
managing and protecting mobile devices in an increasingly mobile enterprise setting [44].
This means that an EMM can block a device from accessing the corporate VPN if not
compliant with certain risk scores, for instance. Our system can send a token over the
network confirming behavioral authorization to other devices (such as a smart, safe box,
for instance), not just other software that exists on the same device.
2.4 Threat Response
In this section, we build on the concept, threat models, and contextual awareness put
forward in the previous sections, and materialize what the response could be, the vehicle
it would use to deliver its impact, and how it would take place in our solution.
NIST has recommended many responses to different threat models, as well as other re-
searchers in the field [44]. We will assume the response can be easily configured by the user,
or Mobile Device Management (MDM), EMM, or an organization SOC, to either restrict
access to certain functions and data or to completely lock the device until further notice
by secure explicit authentication. The latter can take the forms of unlocking from a cloud
account, an email, OTP, a wired enabled hardware authentication factor, a wireless hard-
ware authentication factor using technologies like Bluetooth, NFC, RFID, WiFi, a secret














Figure 2.5: The information and actions flow between the continuous and implicit authentication system, the operating
system, third party applications, and the response system.
Varying possible responses to a “not owner” signal from the Continuous and Implicit
Authentication system are presented below.
• Lock and encrypt the device and immediately, require two authenticators (e.g., pass-
word, PIN, pattern, face, fingerprint, token-based, network-based, domain-based, digital
certificate) to unlock and decrypt the device.
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• Wipe the device after a certain amount of time or failed trials to authenticate, suspecting
the device being lost, stolen, or accessed by unauthorized actors to mitigate the risk of
confidential data recovery
• Revocation of enterprise access
• Removal of certain apps, files, or data (e.g., emails, SMS text messages, private keys)
We believe a policy or a playbook can be leveraged here to configure automated re-
sponses per user requirement to a wide range of threat models. In Security Orchestration,
Automation, and Response (SOAR) products, playbooks are commonly used to respond
to threats in the security monitoring and response industry. For instance, the network
administrators are able to define a playbook that is triggered by a certain anti-virus alert,
to block the IP addresses involved or disable certain machines temporarily. As previously
mentioned, it is highly advised to integrate this system with detection tools for valida-
tion and to maximize benefit across different apps, platforms, and security frameworks. A
multi-layered approach is critical to a successful security program [46]. Occasional testing
is recommended for these policies, and if it is found that there is a breach due to a cer-
tain policy, it is safe to assume it is weak or outdated and hence should be reviewed and
updated.
Sample playbook for response to detected threats could be defined be as follows:
• Our solution could act as a layer in an MFA mechanism to thwart against threat model
(A). In this case, it can trigger an extra authentication step, such as OTP, secret question,
or biometrics
• It would also be able to detect a handover threat model (B), in which case it would
trigger a pre-set configuration such as restrict access to certain applications, settings,
installs, or sensitive data
• In threat model (C), the phone can beep or send an alert to the smartwatch or wearable
gadget assumed to be with the owner. The phone can also be set to reboot or restrict
access to certain information and applications, as well.
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• In threat model (D), the phone can decide to wipe its backed up sensitive contents
completely upon verification that this is a phone theft situation.
We envision the Continuous and Implicit Authentication (CIA) trigger system, seen in
Figure 2.5 to be able to share its detections with other security systems that can benefit
from the threat scoring of particular activity time stretches. The 3rd party apps would
be able to use the data to correlate it with suspicious activities and compound the threat
scoring to come up with a decision about the transactions or access approved or utilized
during the time period. For instance, a banking app can utilize the scoring from the CIA
module based on the inertial sensors in the smartphone and the internal model of the user
of the phone. The authentication state can change and result in further authentication
factors for the user, such as email OTP. Standards like FIDO2 [47] and PIV [48] can
guide the interactions between the module and web applications and other devices. The
integrations will allow it to expand the possible responses beyond the phone itself.
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2.5 Data Types
In this section, we build on the concept, threat models, contextual awareness, and threat
response put forward in the previous sections, and discuss what data types we aim to utilize
in our solution and why.
Off-the-shelf smartphones in the market today come packed with sensors that acquire a
variety of data points around the device at any given point. Below is a list of a few sensors
that are typically available:
• accelerometer
• gyroscope
• magnetometer / compass
• barometer
• ambient light sensor / photometer
• proximity sensor
• battery temperature sensor / thermometer
• touchscreen sensors
• biometric (facial, iris/retina and fingerprint recognition)
• heart rate sensor





Figure 2.6: Some of the sensors present on many phones. Source: [1]
An accelerometer measures the device’s acceleration. A gyroscope measures the device’s
angular velocity. A magnetometer measures the effect of the magnetic field to cope with
the device’s orientation. A barometer measures changes in the atmospheric pressure to
identify elevation. The ambient light sensor detects the surrounding light, allowing for re-
configuring the screen brightness automatically. Proximity sensors measure the distance of
surrounding objects. The battery temperature sensor generates data that can be harvested
to identify the temperature of the phone as well as the surroundings.
Touchscreen sensors measure touches and taps to identify gestures, swipes, multi-touch,
and clicking. The biometric recognition sensors allow for identity authorization using
something the users are, as opposed to know or have, as we discussed in the previous
section [4].
Sensors like heart rate and air humidity help better fitness applications. The camera
allows for visible light collection in the photo or video formats, the microphone allows for
registering and collecting all sounds in the surroundings, and GPS allows the device to
utilize a network of satellites to triangulate the location on earth, where it currently exists.
Each of these sensors can help us identify an environment, user, pattern, or activity
if we analyze the data and utilize data science technologies like data mining or outlier
detection.
Not all sensors were created equal, however, and they incur different power costs, oper-
ating system permissions, as well as data relevancy, noise to signal ratio, and quality. For
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: (a) The Wii™ remote with the MotionPlus™ attachment (b) The Apple IPhone™ 6.
instance, the most expensive three sensors from a power and permissions point of view are
camera, microphone, and GPS [4].
Camera, microphone, bio-metrics, ambient light sensor, barometer, temperature, and
proximity, are all examples of multimedia sensors. Accelerometer, magnetometer, and gy-
roscope are considered motion or inertial sensors as they give us the best data on rotational
and accelerations forces across all axes. They have been used in devices ranging from the
WII controller Figure 2.7 to capture movements of players, to the Apple iPhone 6 Fig-
ure 2.7 to capture orientation, movement, and more. Any device that is equipped with
these inertial sensors probably is fitted with an electronic component commonly referred
to as an Inertial Measurement Unit or IMU, more on which at the end of this chapter.
These analog inertial sensors do not depend on active usage of the smartphone, have
a low power fingerprint, and are not protected behind permission walls like other sensors
such as camera or microphone, and they might have a huge potential in fingerprinting how
a user moves the device while using it, if we harvest and analyze their data properly [4].
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Figure 2.8: Axes of sensors on many phones. Source: [1]
2.5.1 Inertial Sensors
Let’s start by understanding how these sensors work before we take a deep dive into
analyzing their data to potentially improve authentication systems for mobile devices.
Many accelerometers and gyroscopes are based on microelectromechanical system (MEMS)
technology; their components are inexpensive, low-power, light-weight, minuscule, and of
good accuracy and startup times [13, 2].
Frames
To understand the measurements by these sensors we need to define a few coordinate
frames, namingly:
• body frame (b-frame)
• inertial frame (i-frame)
• navigation frame (n-frame)
• earth frame (e-frame)
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Figure 2.9: Coordinate frames, n-frame at a certain location on earth and the e-frame rotating with earth and the i-frame.
Source: [2]
The b-frame is a coordinate frame that is originated at the center of the accelerometer
triad, with axes aligned to the casing, and all the inertial measurements are resolved in
this frame. The I-frame is, simply, a stationary frame originated at the center of the earth
with axes aligned with respect to the stars. The n-frame is a local geographic frame, and
we usually observe the orientation and position of the b-frame with respect to this frame.
The e-frame coincides with the I-frame but with axes fixed with respect to earth, meaning
it rotates with earth.
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Accelerometer
Figure 2.10: Schematic of an accelerometer. Source: [3]
The accelerometer measures the external specific force f , consisting of both of the sensor’s
acceleration and the earth’s gravity, acting on the sensor in the body frame b [2]. Acceler-
ation can be described as dv(t)/dt, where dv(t) is the specific change in velocity over time
t and dt is the time of that velocity change. If we factor in that velocity is nothing but the
derivation of distance over time, we end up with d2x(t)/dt2.
Figure 2.11: Accelerometer structure. Source: [4]
A three-axis accelerometer allows us to cover three-dimensional acceleration, as a single
accelerometer usually detects acceleration on one axis. Measuring the deflection and time
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Figure 2.12: Gyroscope structure. Source: [4]
of a spring-mounted mass, as seen in Figure 2.10 as well as Figure 2.11 during the exposure
to an accelerating force allows the accelerometer to compute these values [3, 4].
Gyroscope
The gyroscope measures the angular measure angular displacement per time of the body
frame with respect to the inertial frame, expressed in the body frame. Three-axis gyro-
scopes allow us to cover three-dimensional angular velocity, as a single gyroscope usually
measures angular velocity on one axis.
As Coriolis vibratory gyroscopes (CVGs) are based on vibrating masses that get de-
flected by the Coriolis force when it is exposed to a torque, as seen in Figure 2.13 and
Figure 2.12. The measured deflection is used to calculate the movement angular velocity.
Gyroscopes are among the sensors with the highest power consumption due to the con-
stant high-frequency vibrations [5], and hence we will evaluate our solution without the
data from the gyroscope to see what is the observed effect on performance.
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Figure 2.13: Schematic of a vibrating gyroscope. Source: [5]
Magnetometer
The magnetometer measures the strength of the magnetic field. This allows the device to
obtain its absolute direction related to the greater earth’s geomagnetic field [4]. Some of
them are built to utilize measurements of detected voltage across a metallic element.
One of the most-known implementations for the magnetometer sensor is referred to
as the search-coil magnetometer [6]. It is based on Faraday’s induction law and hosts a
coil wound around a magnetic iron core. The concept is based on the observation of a
measurable voltage change proportional to the rate of change that is observed at the leads
induced when the magnetic flux through the coiled conductor gets altered in any manner.
Its schematic is to be seen in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: Schematic a search-coil magnetometer. Source: [6]
Most commonly, the types seen in smart devices today are Anisotropic Magnetoresis-
tance (AMR) or Giant Magnetoresistance (GMR), as they are small, cheap, and low-power.
As is the case with the accelerometer and gyroscope, the three axes are needed in all use
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cases, and hence a magnetometer is always built with the ability to read magnetic fields
on all three axes to cover all possible orientations.
Considerations
Magnetometers are not usually standalone modules in today’s devices. The Inertial Mea-
surement Unit (IMU) is a package that commonly holds a three axes magnetometer, ac-
celerometer, and gyroscope. They are commonly fitted with self-calibration features and
are commonly available in devices today, as they are cheap and extremely helpful in many
applications like gesture recognition and image stabilization [13].
Inaccuracies find their way into such data streams due to calibration errors, drift, or
noise. Some of the manufacturers of such electronic components fit solutions to handle
the problem of noise, using noise reduction technologies. These solutions can go as far
as making new high-level fusion sensors data such as orientation sensors that can utilize
all three accelerometers, magnetometer, and gyroscope processed and noise-reduced data
streams to enable applications to use more robust data points. Such fusion sensors (e.g.,
relative orientation sensor, absolute orientation sensor, geomagnetic orientation sensor,
gravity sensor, linear acceleration sensor) can also be calculated by third-party applica-
tions, using the underlying physical sensors discussed: magnetometer, accelerometer, and
gyroscope, to account for their use cases (e.g., gaming, augmented reality) [49].
2.5.2 Security Issues with Mobile Sensing
Despite their effectiveness in user behavior profiling, the leakage of mobile sensor data can
put the user’s privacy and security in jeopardy. For instance, malware can target a specific
group of people with a common trait or behavior, which can be identified using their motion
sensor data. A more alarming example is cyber-criminals purchasing the user’s sensor data
from a data broker [50] or a third-party mobile application developer, in order to locate an
individual within their house [30], detect their current activity [51], identify the number of
people living with the individual [52], and detect their sleeping patterns [53, 54] [55].
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Thus, we have to be cautious with the data generated by our devices. Harvesting these
valuable data sources can reveal too much information about the user. Hence, we limit
the amount of data needed to one sensor data, but we also understand that the data from
this sensor alone may be sufficient to obtain information about a user’s location, body
features, gender, age, activities, health condition, personality traits, and emotional state.
The data can even be used to uniquely identify a user based on their biometric movement
patterns and to reconstruct sequences of text entered into a device, including passwords,
for instance [56].
In Chapter 7, we propose the exploration of our work’s intersection with differential
privacy in order to protect accelerometer data in transit. Additionally, we develop our
solution architecture (cf., Chapter 2) to allow for mobile sensor data to never leave the
phone. The training for our method can occur at the device, thanks to our light machine
learning shallow generative neural network proposed in Chapter 4, adding a layer of security
and privacy to the solution.
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2.6 Performance Metrics
In this section, we build on the concept, threat models, contextual awareness, threat re-
sponse, and data types put forward in the previous sections and discuss how we would
interpret and score our results to highlight certain properties of the solution’s models.
Many metrics exist in this domain, but few are adopted by the research community in
continuous authentication literature.
There are many authentication systems that use machine learning. However, there is
yet to be a consistent approach and metric for reporting performance. Evaluation is of
pivotal importance to machine learning problems. Choosing the metrics to use is very
important since a solution will be as good as its performance metric.
Recent works have shown that maximum accuracy (ACC), equal error rate (EER) as
well, as Area Under the Receiver operator characteristic curve (ROC) curve (AUROC)
hide the details of the inherent trade-offs a system must make when implemented, and
hence are all, although very abundant in the body of research, inherently flawed [57].
Predictions from binary classifiers are in the form of true or positive. In the case of
outlier detection, true means outlier, and false means benign, or part of the expected
distribution. These predictions can be categorized into true-positive (TP), false-positive
(FP), true-negative (TN), and false-negative (FN). These four values often are grouped
into a confusion matrix (CM) or used to calculate other performance metrics. CM is a
table of contingency counts.
It is important to note that performance is not consistently reported in one metric in
authentication systems. For instance, False Acceptance Rate (FAR), some times referred
to as False Positive Rate (FPR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR), sometimes referred to
as False Negative Rate (FNR), are used in many authentication works, where they are not
meaningful in many cases since they present a point on a trade-off. FNR presents how often
a legitimate user is denied, FPR presents how often an illegitimate user is authorized, True
Negative Rate (TNR) presents how often an illegitimate user is denied, and True Positive
Rate (TPR) how often a legitimate user is authorized. True rejection rate (TRR) is the
probability of the system to correctly reject impostors, and True acceptance rate (TAR)
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Figure 2.15: FAR, FRR and the EER point. Source: [7]
is the probability of the system correctly identify legitimate users. We can not tell based
on these metrics whether the model is able to discriminate successfully or did the authors
adjust the system parameters to inflate the metric. TPR and FPR, as well as FPR and
FRR, are based on a compromise between two kinds of misclassifications, and hence all
are inherently flawed.
One of them most reported metrics in the research domain is ACC.
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(2.1)
It is the relative frequency of correct classification. Often the value of accuracy that
is reported is the maximum across thresholds. That presents a challenge to researchers
because only a single threshold is represented in this performance metric. Researchers
cannot know how the accuracy will change if the threshold is set in a way that satisfies an
FPR requirement at an inconvenience to the TPR, for instance. ACC does not identify
the type of user, be it authorized or unauthorized, when misclassification is made.
The most popular metric is Equal Error Rate (EER); it is the point that TPR equals
1-FPR on the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as seen in Figure 2.15.
The ROC curve is the curve of TPR and FPR by varying thresholds. Ideally, the curve
should grow toward the top-left, meaning that the model makes correct predictions. The
area under ROC (AUROC) is the probability that the scores of random legitimate users
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are higher than an illegitimate user. But all single-number summaries hide the details of
which errors occurred and how.












“Harmonic mean” of precision and recall (F1) is defined as a combination of the two
metrics:
F1 = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(2.4)
There has been work defining some metrics to use in authentication systems, but they
all suffer from a lack of use and hence are very hard to use for comparing results and
approaches to existing work [58, 57]. It is still best to report metrics like EER and ACC to
allow other researchers to compare results and understand the impact new additions and
ideas can bring to the system. It is advisable to report more metrics to allow researchers
to grasp the fundamentals of the system behavior. It is also of pivotal importance to open
source the code base, dataset, and model architecture to allow for easy reproducibility.
Another two quality metrics we aim to maximize our usability which is minimizing
FNR and the time the system is blocking or hindering regular device usage and energy
consumption which is minimizing the use of energy involved in the authentication process.
Mobile devices, as well as the Internet of Things and others, are generally built as resource-
constrained devices, so we aim to be considerate and help maximize the lifetime of the
device benefiting from our solution.
In our work, we will use all the popular metrics and will allow for easy reproducibility




In this chapter, we look at various existing contributions, studies, and analyses found in our
research domain, tackling different aspects of our solution. From well-known datasets to
new machine learning algorithms that have profoundly impacted the literature, we explore
the steps needed for our overall solution, the CIA system, and compare different meth-
ods. We underline the most relevant studies to our work, which also propose innovative
Continuous and Implicit Authentication mechanisms based on smartphone sensor data. A
summary of these works can be found in Table 3.2. Our literature survey spans various sen-
sor modalities, threat vectors, data sets, and evaluation metrics. This makes it difficult for
researchers to compare and cross-examine these methods. However, insightful comparisons,
with fixed variables and controlled experiments, are presented in our extensive evaluations
later in Chapter 5, to allow for hypothesis validations and further investigations.
3.1 Datasets
In the interest of practical studies, we start by choosing the categories of datasets that
are general enough to produce reliable analyses. For instance, we exclude human activity
recognition (HAR) related datasets [59, 60, 61] as they are usually collected in strictly
controlled environments and hence are not useful for our real-world scenario Continuous
and Implicit Authentication use case.
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The LiveLab Traces [62] dataset consists of smartphone sensors, apps, and calls data
from 35 users. However, the captured duration per user varied greatly as some users are
tracked for a few days while others are tracked for a year. Surveys, such as those released
by Abuhamad et al. [63] and Gonzalez et al. [64], have featured a plethora of continuous
authentication works and datasets that have been geared towards features such as touch,
leap motion controllers, orientation, pressure, camera, cyclic rotation metric, force sensing,
compass, microphone, speaker, light sensor, gravity sensor, elevation, healthcare wearables,
piezoelectric and electromagnetic energy harvester. These features and their respective
datasets are used by multi-modal authentication systems that use keystroke dynamics,
voice, gait, or motion-based sensors. However, the primary shortcoming of most of these
datasets is their size and diversity, as they are typically gathered from fewer than 100
users. Thus, their results might be unreliable for real-world deployments and render most
of the research work in this domain hard to use in a real environment. It is notable for
highlighting that commercial-grade Continuous and Implicit Authentication systems do not
currently exist due to performance and reliability limitations. To overcome the practical
limitations, more research and development efforts are required in which the compilation
of more diverse public datasets and better technologies need to be employed to push this
domain further.
Multiple studies [65, 66, 19, 67] have chosen to collect their own custom datasets,
sometimes from up to 1500 users [66] or 30 sensor modalities [67], but unfortunately have
not made them public. Privacy concerns are among the primary reasons for authors refusing
to release the users’ data. However, this hinders the reproducibility and comparability of
the resulting works. Along with the high cost of gathering such datasets, this compels us
to avoid such an approach in our work.
The scarcity of high-quality labeled mobile sensor datasets has been one of the main
obstacles to research in this area. In 2015, Crowdsignals.io [68] was born as a “crowdfund-
ing campaign to fund the largest ethically collected set of high-quality, labeled mobile and
sensor data for use by the research community”. Although the project exceeded its funding
target and generated incredible interest and support, its dataset is yet to be published.
The most fitting dataset to our use cases is a public dataset that has been the de facto
standard in the field of continuous authentication since its release in 2015. HMOG [24]
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is a public dataset released in 2015, which has been used extensively in the Continuous
Authentication literature [16, 20, 19, 24, 69, 70]. HMOG includes data collected from
smartphone accelerometers, gyroscopes, magnetometers, tap coordinates, finger-covered
areas, or pressure from 100 subjects during 24 sessions. In the study group, predefined
realistic scenarios have been played out by the users, which makes it more reliable than
similar datasets [71]. All sessions in HMOG include active usage and are generally less
than 15 minutes long. A slightly larger dataset was released publicly in 2019 by Belman
et al. [72]. However, it has not been used as extensively in the domain, and this makes
comparability of its results more difficult. Thus, we find HMOG to be one of the best
candidates for our evaluations. The high diversity of scenarios, data balance, validation
from existing literature, and appropriate features in the dataset make it a better alternative
to the other public datasets in this domain.
With that, we conclude this section with the selection of the de facto HMOG as a
suitable dataset for its inclusion of inertial data, its publicity, and the comparability it
brings to our work. Moreover, we delve into the domain further and look at how inertial
data type has been utilized in the smartphone Continuous Authentication use case.
3.2 Mobile Sensing
As discussed in Chapter 2, inertial data captures the motion, orientation, and location
of the device in its surrounding space. The approaches that utilize this kind of data for
non-intrusive user authentication leverage patterns from the user’s behavior such as their
gait, touchscreen interactions, hand waving, keystroke patterns, voice, or signature moves
and thus create a behavioural profile.
One of the first authors that collected their own extensive continuous authentication
dataset and used a one class distance-based classifier, Zheng et al. [73] used the iner-
tial data coming from the device’s accelerometer and gyroscope and augmented it with
touchscreen data, acceleration, pressure, size of the touch area, and time intervals between
interactions. They are able to analyze and profile how each user touches their phone while
they put in their PIN codes and classify the current session as either the true owner or an
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imposter with up to 3.6% EER. Another early work that used deep learning is Trojahn et
al. [74]. They utilized both keystroke and handwriting analytics to authenticate users of
a smartphone, using data of when the users are entering their password repeatedly. They
utilized models such as the Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) [75], Bayesian Net classifiers [76],
and Naive Bayes [77] for their classification.
A few years later, Neverova et al. [78] used the large-scale data collected in Google’s
Abacus project and time-based deep feature extraction, using RNNs and CNNs for user
authentication. They classified the data using a Dense Clockwork RNN model. As men-
tioned in Section 3.1, the Google Abacus dataset is reported to include data from 1500 users
captured in real-life situations, but unfortunately, it has not been released to the public.
Soon after, Shen et al. [19] showed great success on HMOG and have collected a dataset
of more than 27,000 data instances from 10 subjects, extracting wavelet, frequency, and
time-domain features and evaluating several algorithms such as Support Vector Machines,














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There exist multiple important behavioural biometric studies in the scientific literature,
which are summarized in Table 3.1 adopted from Ul-Haq et al. [18]. The approaches these
studies took span gestures, keystroke, touchscreen, handwriting, voice, and gait. The
primary limitations in gestures-based studies include the fact that they require the user to
interact actively in the authentication process, and once a device is unlocked, an imposter
can not be detected. On the other hand, solutions based on keystroke dynamics are limited
in that they require a lot of data compared to other modes, disruptions during typing will
give false signals, they get affected by the variations in user behaviour (e.g., different
moods) and switching keyboards might change the learned patterns. Touchscreen-based
studies also have shortcomings in those interactions in every orientation are different, and
the current user activity affects the interaction significantly. Methods based on handwriting
are mainly not developed for the sake of Continuous Authentication capability, and the
phone may not be steady all the time to confidently detect a change in the pattern. Voice-
based works are hampered by the surrounding environment’s noise. Gait-based works are
vulnerable to changes created by different outfits that may alter the walking pattern, as
well as the requirement to fix the sensors on the body at all times to a good position [18].
Multiple works [79, 91, 70] have been aimed at authenticating a user while doing a
specific activity like typing a password, making a call, or picking the phone from the table.
It mainly consists of human activity recognition and then authentication. Though that
might be an easier machine learning problem and might yield good better results, it suffers
from a lack of continuity. For instance, once a user is authenticated, the phone would not
know how to classify the activities in their various types that are happening until that
same activity happens again later. This subdomain in user authentication benefits from
activity recognition advancements, covered in Appendix A.2, in the last few years that made
detecting a user’s current activity accurately a reality. User activities that motion sensors
can capture can be categorised into simple and complex. Simple activities include walking,
sitting, sleeping, going upstairs or downstairs, or laying down. Conversely, activities like
driving a car, changing clothes, riding a bike, and exercising are typical examples of complex
activities. For instance, using GPS and accelerometer data, Martin et al. [98] propose a
method that detects periods of walking, biking, car, bus, and rail transportation methods in
real-time. GPS data is successfully used by Martin et al. [98] to achieve 96% accuracy with
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a random forest classifier on data transformed with Principal component analysis (PCA)
and recursive feature elimination (RFE). However, GPS stays an infeasible solution for
practical usage in CIA use cases due to its high battery power consumption and necessity
to have user’s permissions to operate and utilize its data. Also, using accelerometer and
gyroscope data, Anguita et al. [99] used a Support Vector Machine (SVM) model to
detect walking at a 95% accuracy, climbing upstairs at a 72% accuracy, standing at 92%
accuracy, sitting at 94% accuracy, laying down at 100% accuracy, and going downstairs
at 79% accuracy. Using similar features, Ronao et al. [100] explored human activity
recognition with deep learning and artificial neural networks, with an accuracy of ˜95%.
3.3 Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing refers to a stage where certain techniques are used to transform data
into a more desired form to enhance learning for an artificially intelligent agent. As the
studies in the Continuous and Implicit Authentication domain use very different mech-
anisms to perform data preprocessing, we cover the most important approaches in the
upcoming paragraphs.
One of the main drawbacks of mobile device data sensors and inertial data sensors
specifically is the signal-to-noise ratio. As discussed in Chapter 2, the data will almost
always get contaminated in the collection phase, and researchers aim to improve the quality
of the data being fed to their models using noise reduction modules. For instance, Deb et
al. [67] utilized the Fast Fourier Transform to map inertial data measurements from the
time to frequency domain.
In an interesting study, Shen et al. [19] used kinematic information extraction to
filter measurements of inertial sensors and touch events. The authors employ a Kalman
filter and then decompose signals using wavelet functions and threshold analysis. They
then reconstruct the original signal by using inverse wavelet functions. This approach
handles noise that appears in the whole spectrum as opposed to Reyes-Ortiz et al. [101]
where the authors separated movement and gravitational elements of the data from the
accelerometer data and used a butter-worth low-pass filter with a cutoff, 0.3 Hz, to capture
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the low frequencies of gravity. Similarly, Haq et al. [102] used a smoothing filter of three
samples length at a certain frequency, 50Hz.
Several works in this domain construct new features by applying operations to raw
features, not to add any new information to the data but to transform the data into
a more suitable representation and form for the models to learn. Such operations can
include sliding time windows and statistical and temporal metrics of the data. The relevant
constructed features in the Continuous Authentication domain include magnitude, min,
max, entropy, and an average of the gyroscope sensor data, as well as the entropy and
magnitude of the accelerometer sensor data. Cycle-based approaches allow for features
to be aggregated without fixed windows but rather based on cyclic events. For instance,
human steps in walking can be used in gait models. Cycle detection is usually the most
difficult to perform accurately in real-world scenarios since the phone might be held or
attached loosely rather than fixed or strapped properly to the body [13].
Sarova et al. [24] developed a set of metrics to capture grasp resistance, grasp stability,
tap, keystroke, and touch events in HMOG. Further sampling, scaling, cropping, and
jittering are all techniques that have also been used on top of HMOG [24] by Li et al. [69].
In our experiments, we also propose our own preprocessing method, which is covered in
Chapter 5.
Dimensional reduction is another technique for data preprocessing. By transforming
the data into a lower-dimensional space, the computational effort needed to analyze an
event can be reduced while retaining the most important components to generate insights.
In the effort to represent the data in the new space, the pre-processor is compelled to
discard the noise and low-importance features while keeping the important semantics and
patterns. Our approach is designed to find the most meaningful subset inherently given
any data instance, as explained in Chapter 4.
Among other works, Neverova et al. [66], utilized PCA to perform dimensionality
reduction. Other work like Shen et al. [19] utilized mutual information and fisher custom
score thresholds to reduce their features by more than 80%, which leads to 38 final features,
including kurtosis and skewness.
Some of the works in the literature use deep features instead of manually computing
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metrics to better represent their raw data. Neural Networks can learn filtering, feature
construction, and dimensionality reduction effectively. Neverova [66] evaluated CNN, plain
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), and Clockwork
Recurrent Neural Network (CNN) to analyze their ability in generating deep features for
the purpose of Continuous Authentication, as well as proposed Dense Clockwork Recurrent
Neural Network (DCWRNN).
Centeno et al. [20] used a Siamese CNN to construct features that differentiate im-
posters from authenticated users from raw sensor data. These deep features would then be
fed to an OCSVM for classification. Their work is by far the most regarded in the domain,
and its re-implementation is covered thoroughly in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis.
As part of the data preprocessing, a model can try to understand the environment in
which the data was collected. This can be done through third-party application collabora-
tion like that described in Chapter 2 or alternatively through evaluating the user activity
or status at the temporal neighborhood. Some works [102, 103] have explored environ-
ment sensing by detecting the context first then doing authentication later. However, their
results indicate little benefits in their implementations and experiments. We propose a
variant of this technique in Chapter 7.
We will be experimenting with different methods of data processing in Chapter 5 that
include deep feature extraction using a variety of models.
3.4 Machine Learning Models
Numerous works have tackled the problem of Continuous Authentication and proposed a
variety of machine learning models and data pipelines to push towards higher performance
scores and lower latencies. This section provides an overview of machine learning models
which are considered to be most relevant to our work.
We could approach the problem with either the one-class approach, binary class ap-
proach, or multi-class approach. A one-class model only trains on the device owner’s data
and aims to classify this user given sensory data at any given point. The multi-class model
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would have access to a few users, of which one is the device owner; this would make sense
if we were able to enumerate and collect data for all the possible imposters. Such a case
where multi or binary class would make sense is in a closed environment such as a strict
campus or facility.
However, due to the uncertainty of who would be the imposter in our use cases and
threat models, detailed in Chapter 2, we, along with most of the works in this domain,
choose to focus on the one class approach. Where we can not assume we have data on the
imposter’s behavioral profile, but rather only the device owner.
Most Relevant Studies that used HMOG
Work Features AI Model Performance Time
Centeno et al.
2018 [20]





Constructed n-gram FAR 13.15%, FRR 15.29% 4.96s
Li et al.
2018 [69]
Constructed OCSVM 4.66% EER 5s
Shen et al.
2018 [19]
Constructed HMM FAR 5.13%, FRR 6.74% 8s
Centeno et al.
2017 [16]
Raw Autoencoder 4.5% EER 20s
Volaka et al.
2019 [104]
Deep Deep Neural Net-
work
15% EER, 88% Accuracy -
Sitova et al.
2015 [24]





Constructed KRR 3.0% EER -
Amini et al.
2018 [106]
Constructed LSTM 72.29 ACC -
Table 3.2: Best One Class solutions that reported results on HMOG
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Centeno et al. work [20] shows great promise, as they achieve very high accuracy
and low latency with the help of a Siamese CNN network for deep feature extraction
along with an OCSVM for impostor classification. Buech [13] re-implemented the work
reported by Centeno et al. [20] and proposed improvements to the evaluation criteria.
Their improved evaluation criteria make the experiment closer to real-life scenarios. For
instance, normalization is performed only on the benign subset of the training dataset. We
also adopt this approach and build upon the state-of-the-art, as detailed in Chapter 5.
Artificial neural networks have been used in deep feature generation and authentication
in this domain. Shen et al. [19] used a three-layer MLP against a Hiden Markov Model and
an OCSVM. An autoencoder has been used for outlier detection by Centeno et al. [16],
with very promising results. The authors trained the autoencoder with samples from the
owner in a single-class approach. The model learns to reconstruct the benign data better
than the data it never saw, which is assumed to be anomalous. The distance between
the input vector and its reconstruction is expected to be lower for samples from the real
device owner compared to a sample from an impostor. Binary classification is achieved by
applying a threshold to the model’s confidence in the input’s anomaly [13].
Volaka et al. [104] used a Deep Neural Network trained on touch and motion features.
The model used by the authors consisted of 3 dense layers and 128 nodes and was trained
for 200 epochs. In their evaluations, they achieved 15% EER and 88% accuracy. As seen
in Chapter 5 we outperform their results, using much less computational power, thanks to
our use of generative neural models.
3.4.1 Generative Models
VAEs [107, 108, 109] and GANs [110] are among the most popular and established gen-
erative neural network models. The regularities in the training data are expressed by a
probability distribution in a lower-dimensional latent space, which is created by the gener-
ators. The use of generative models for anomaly detection has been explored extensively
in machine learning literature, making it a very fruitful area of research in the past few
years.
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The details of VAE models and their usage is covered in Chapter 4. We take this
opportunity to highlight GANs, which we encourage as an avenue for future works (cf.,
Chapter 7). Exploring the utilization of GANs along with VAEs, like in Adversarial Au-
toencoders [111, 112, 113, 114] can create many opportunities in future research, such as
the work put forward by Ibrahim et al. [115] or Ueda et al. work [116], for the CIA use
case.
GANs pose the problem of learning the target distribution as a zero-sum game. The
generator network is trained in competition with an adversary, the discriminator, that
challenges it to generate samples whose distribution is similar to the training distribution.
AnoGAN [117] was one of the first works to propose GANs for anomaly detection, which
started the emerging research field. It aimed to use GANs trained on benign data only.
The generator will then learn how to make new benign samples, while the discriminatory
will know how to tell benign from not. When an outlier instance is encoded, its reconstruc-
tion will be benign, and the difference between the input and the reconstructed instance
will highlight the anomaly. One of the limitations of the proposed method was that it suf-
fered in terms of test-time performance. Moreover, the anomaly score, set to be a convex
combination of the reconstruction loss and the discrimination loss, is hard to interpret as
compared to more familiar metrics such as probabilities. The objective of the GAN was
also not modified to take into account inverse mapping learning.
Further evolution of these methods included EGBAD [118] which outperforms AnoGAN,
and GANomaly [119] which outperforms both in accuracy and speed. Mattia et al. [120]
published a survey evaluating all GAN-based anomaly detectors and discussing their inher-
ent differences and strengths. The use of adversarial generative models is beyond the scope
of our work as there are genuine concerns regarding their robustness and computational
complexity, as systematically shown by works such as Skvara et al. [121].
VAEs are a popular class of probabilistic AutoEncoders [122]. Xu et al. [123] use
VAE to detect anomaly data for seasonal KPIs in web applications since VAE prevents
over-fitting by allowing noise and randomness of latent variables. Chen et al. [124] uses
the VAE-LSTM architecture for anomaly detection and robust prediction of time series.
Luo et al. [125] use the VAE-SVDD with a BiGRU hidden layer and a latent variable that
is big enough to use temporal correlations. VAE-based anomaly detectors are redefining
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the state-of-the-art performance and speed in many applications e.g., web, image, and
intrusion detection [126, 127, 128]. Park et al. show VAE anomaly detectors, with LSTM,
on multi-modal sequential data [129]. Another work in this area, Cerrie et al. [130], is
geared towards new physics mining at the Large Hadron Collider.
We aim to utilize VAEs in this use case and experiment with a few implementations
of VAEs in Chapter 5. We do not aim to test GANs due to robustness and complexity
issues [121].
3.5 Experiment Settings
A wide range of experiment and evaluation settings, as well as datasets, are being used in
the literature for showcasing the effectiveness of CIA frameworks, which makes it impossible
to have fair comparisons between results. This is concerning for the research in this area,
as it is commonplace for authors to compare results against other works without further
information into the evaluation configurations.
The performance metrics also vary between different works, although EER and accuracy
are by far the most popular, and that adds to the comparability of these works. We delved
into performance metrics in the previous chapter Chapter 2 and furthermore discussed
what metrics are more fitting in this domain. Some works report metrics for subsets of
their data, like certain scenarios individually, as seen in Sitova et al. [24] while some use
general metrics for their entire datasets e.g., Centeno et al. [16, 20].
Another problem is that the setup settings vary greatly between these works. While
some of them might have 10-fold cross-validation random, one vs. one scenario, [20], others
randomly draw from a pool of attacks and sample benign instances along in a one vs. all
fashion [69]. Some even reported values that were improved by calculating the mean of the
individual sample’s score across a sliding window [19, 65].
All of these issues pertain to the works using the same public dataset, as seen in
Figure 5.18. As discussed in Section 3.1, many publications e.g., Neverova et al. [66], and
Deb et al. [131], work with data that is not available for others to reproduce. This adds
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another layer of complexity that makes comparability in the domain very difficult without
all of these settings somehow fixed and standardized.
Shen et al. [19] took the effort to compare many one-class models and offer us some
comparable results from which we can draw insights and conclusions, but unfortunately,
through correspondence, we were unable to get the codebase or the datasets they used.
We aim to also run many models in a comparable fashion to allow others to draw insights
and conclusions from our work. Conversely, we are committed to releasing code and data
used in our work in the interest of transparency and reproducibility.
We are going to explore a few experiment settings in Chapter 5, with an aim to be
comparable to other works as well as find a setting that is highly realistic, given our aim
to bridge the gap between academic works like those presented and real-world use cases




In this chapter, we discuss our approach to solving the problem discussed in Chapter 2.
This chapter details the thought process, decisions, architecture, considerations, and design
of the system proposed due to the study presented in this thesis. Our proposed solution
aims to act as a trigger module based on a change in the typical behavior of phone usage and
movements. Previous research efforts have tried to detect the act of handing over itself,
i.e., threat model (B), or the act of leaving behind itself, threat model (C), as trigger
events that can be fingerprinted and detected in their recurring variants [132]. We find the
detection of the user behavior deviating from being the most pivotal to the resiliency and
robustness to the coverage of the use cases and threat models domain. Nonetheless, our
solution can work in tandem with other modules and systems, like the ones detecting the
very events of handing over or leaving behind, to enhance the overall detection coverage,
capabilities, performance, and abilities. This chapter discusses the data, the models, and
the techniques we considered to evaluate the solution.
4.1 Data
We choose to work with inertial data only, hence effectively limiting our algorithms to data
streams coming only from the accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer in the forms
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commonly installed and fitted on off-the-shelf smartphones, as covered in Chapter 2. This
ensures continuous availability and low privacy concerns, low resource footprint, low power
footprint, and no limitations imposed by the operating system. This will allow us to track
deviations in minor movements in the user demeanor and make it possible for the module
to identify a person’s unique behavior, given that the model is powerful enough.
4.2 Classical Machine Learning Models
Our selection of machine learning models limits the options to anomaly detection or outlier
detection, or novelty detection algorithms. Anomaly detection refers to the task of detect-
ing anomalous instances given the distribution of data. An observation belonging to the
distribution is commonly referred to as an inlier, while any outlying instance is commonly




Supervised models are trained on observations with a ground truth label for both inliers
and outliers. The supervised approach is taken when ground truth labels are given, and it
is assumed that the anomalies will follow the same distribution as in the training data set.
Unsupervised models are trained on observations without any ground truth label for
both inliers and outliers alike. The models can differentiate outliers during the training
period and fit to detect the difference learned. Unsupervised techniques are preferred when
the anomalies are defined as points that do not belong to high-density regions.
Semi-supervised models are trained and fit on labeled observations describing normal
behavior only. The approach is taken when outliers are defined as data points that differ
from the distribution of the benign training data, given as ground truth. Any observations
differing from the benign training dataset are considered anomalies, even if they form a
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Figure 4.1: Anomaly detection approaches arranged in the plane spanned by two major components (model and feature
map) of our unifying view. Based on shared principles, we distinguish One-Class Classification, probabilistic models, and
reconstruction models as the three main groups of approaches that formulate shallow and deep models. Purely distance-based
methods complement these three groups. Adopted from [8]
high-density region or cluster. The semi-supervised approach is the best fit for this problem
since we would have the opportunity to gather ground truth labels from the benign user
of the phone at some point.
Although state-of-the-art and many works in past literature base their findings on Deep
Learning techniques, we do not aim to make the system lightweight, fast, and efficient in the
interest of practicality. Due to their recent success in many anomaly detection problems,
we also aim to leverage generative models such as Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE). VAE
have a wide range of varieties. We decide to utilize the most commonly used models
in the domain and choose one based on timing, performance, and stability across a few
experiments. The models we chose to evaluate our VAE, β-VAE, KNN, OCSVM, ABOD,
CBLOF, FeatureBag, HBOS, IForest, LOF, PCA. This selection allows us to sample the
most esteemed algorithms across linear, proximity-based, probabilistic, ensembles, and
neural networks, as seen in Figure 4.2. Other familiar categorization of anomaly detection
algorithms showed in Figure 4.1, supports that this selection is diversified and will allow






























Linear Proximity-Based Neural NetworkProbabilistic Ensemble
Figure 4.2: Anomaly detection approaches arranged in the plane categorised by their underlying type. The 5 categories in
the anomaly detection models literature are linear based, proximity based, neural networks based, probabilistic based, and
ensembles. Models we used in our evaluations are bold-ed for emphasis.
sections, we provide a brief introduction to some of these models.
4.2.1 Linear, Probabilistic, Density, and Ensemble-based Models
Linear
PCA (Principal Component Analysis) [133] is a linear transformation often used for di-
mensional reduction to allow for easy data exploration and analysis. The technique used
highlights the variance co-variance structure of a few variables through a set of new vari-
ables, which are the original variables’ functions. The principal components are linear
combinations of these random variables that are not correlated, sorted by variance starting
from the first, and conserve the total variation in the original variables.
OCSVM (One-class Support Vector Machine) [134] is a linear algorithm that aims at
learning a decision boundary to group the data points. Once the model is trained, each data
point is classified based on the normalized distance of the data point from the determined
decision boundary.
MCD (Minimum Covariance Determinant) [135] is an estimator of multivariate location
and scatter. It is to be applied to Gaussian data but can also be helpful on data drawn
from a uni-modal, symmetric distribution.
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Proximity-based
HBOS (Histogram-based Outlier Score) [136] is a proximity-based technique that models
uni-variate feature densities using histograms with a fixed or a dynamic bin width. Once
the computations are in, all histograms compute an outlier score for each instance presented
in the data. It can achieve linear time complexity, O(n), if used with a fixed bin width.
KNN (K-Nearest neighbors) [137] is a proximity-based model. For each data point,
the whole data set is examined to extract the k data points with the most similar feature
values. These are then defined as the k nearest neighbors. Once the nearest neighbors
are found, the data instance is classified as anomalous if and only if the majority of those
nearest neighbors were previously classified as anomalous; otherwise, the data point is
benign.
LOF (Local Outlier Factor) [138] is a proximity-based method that captures precisely
the relative degree of isolation of an object from its surrounding neighborhood. The outlier
factor is local because only a restricted neighborhood of each object is taken into account.
The approach is loosely related to density-based clustering.
CBLOF (Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor) [139] is a proximity-based method. The
outlier score is computed by the distance of each instance of the data to its respective
cluster center multiplied by the instances belonging to its cluster.
Probabilistic
ABOD (Angle-based Outlier Detection) [140] is a Proximity-based technique built for high-
dimensional data anomaly detection tasks. It is a parameter-free approach based on the
variance of angles between pairs of data instances. Using the variance in the angles between
a data point to the other points as an anomaly score, ABOD is one of the most popular
techniques for anomaly detection on high-dimensional data sets.
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Ensemble
Forrest (Isolation Forest) [141] is an ensembling technique that is based on the usage of
numerous isolation trees, a tree structure constructed effectively to isolate every single
instance. The idea is based on the susceptibility of anomalies to isolation; hence anomalies
are found closer to the root of the tree; whereas ordinary points are isolated at the deeper
end of the tree. Isolation Forest builds an ensemble of isolation trees and defines anomalies
as those instances with the shortest average path lengths on the trees formed.
FeatureBag [142] is an ensemble technique applying Feature Bagging for outlier de-
tection. The technique is based on combining results from multiple outlier detection al-
gorithms that are put into action with different sets of features. Every outlier detection
algorithm uses a small subset of randomly selected features from the original feature set.
The anomaly scores computed by the individual algorithms are then combined to find
better quality anomalies in the data set.
Limitations
Linear models like PCA are limited to data encodings that can only exploit linear feature
correlations [8]. Deep models need significant amounts of training data to achieve accept-
able performance; hence we will refrain from making our VAE and β-VAE deep: exceeding
three layers in the architecture. KNN needs to have the number of neighbors K manually
chosen; it also suffers from the “curse of dimensionality” and needs data scaling as it does
not perform well on imbalanced data [143]. Classification models like SVMs are not ap-
propriate for non-linear problems, have overlapped classes, or have many features. Many
of these models also are very slow, as we will see in the experiment chapter.
4.3 Generative Models
A recent addition to the domain of outlier and anomaly detection is the use of genera-
tive models. The generative model is an umbrella term that covers a vast spectrum of
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Figure 4.3: Taxonomy of generative models. Source: [9]
ML models. VAEs [109] are among the most popular ones and have shown great perfor-
mance in recent ML literature for a large variety of tasks ranging from fairness in ML to
better image generation. It is recognized that generative models can yield better perfor-
mance for abnormal event detection due to their inherent Gaussian distribution modeling
properties [144]. Other examples of popular generative models are Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) [145], PixelRNN [146] and PixelCNNs [147] which leverage Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) [148] and Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [149] respectively,
as seen in Figure 4.3. VAE optimizes variational lower bound on likelihood and hence
produces good latent representations and allows inference queries. PixelRNN and Pixel-
CNN are explicit density models that optimize exact likelihood and make good samples
but inefficient sequential generation. GANs are a game-theoretic approach and generate
the best samples but can be tricky and unstable to train, with no inference queries. [9]
VAEs are stochastic inference algorithms deeply rooted in Bayesian statistical models.
However, they are based on the older Auto-Encoder model, which has two neural networks:
an encoder and a decoder. In the Auto-Encoder Figure 4.6, the encoder network aims to
learn a smaller representation of the data it trains on, and then the decoder reconstructs
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Figure 4.4: Auto-Encoder model architecture. Source: [10]
the original data from the smaller representation the encoder created, outputting the recon-
struction of the input data to the encoder. The encoder learns a compressed representation
called code, bottleneck, vector, latent features, latent variables, latent space vector of the
input. The decoder learns how to reconstruct the input based on the latest features. The
network as a whole tries to minimize reconstruction error: by minimizing the input and
output differences. VAEs have been proved across many works and data sets to be the
best novelty detection generative model due to their unique properties [121].
4.3.1 Auto-Encoder
The Auto-Encoder, seen in Figure 4.5, can serve as a good anomaly detector since it
has excellent feature extraction capabilities. Imagine training an Auto-Encoder on benign
samples and minimizing reconstruction errors on it. After training, the Auto-Encoder sees
malicious input and cannot reconstruct with low error rates anymore since it only knows
how to recognize the patterns of the benign data. An anomaly score could be set to mimic
the reconstruction error. It serves as a deviation-based anomaly detector in what is referred
to as a semi-supervised learning fashion.
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Figure 4.5: Auto-Encoder architecture featuring the encoder and decoder multi layered networks.
Source: [11]
4.3.2 Variational Auto-Encoder
VAE is the graphical Bayesian inference probabilistic variant of the Auto-Encoder. As op-
posed to the Auto-Encoder where the encoder and decoder implement two complementary
deterministic transformations, in VAE, it is a distribution that is being learned, and the
output is a draw from that underlying distribution. The VAE’s small representation is
referred to as the latent variable and usually fits a prior distribution. The standard choice
for that distribution is the Gaussian distribution [150], although other distributions such
as the Mises-Fisher distribution are used in some variations of the VAE. The encoder is
its posterior distribution, and the decoder is its likelihood distribution. Prior is a belief in
some quantity, typically on a set of parameters, without observations at the data. When
data is involved, the belief is updated and is called a posterior.
As part of a class of likelihood-based directed graphical generative models, a VAE
maximizes the likelihood of the training data according to a generative model [151] [152].
We know an Auto-Encoder minimizes reconstruction loss, but a Variational Auto-Encoder
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also ensures that latent vectors are sampled from a Gaussian mixture and take a fixed
range of values, referred to as latent loss. Unlike AEs, VAEs can also generate data much
like GANs without the overhead of introducing a min-max game or the Nash equilibrium
challenge. VAEs are very useful with complex distributions as they try to find a smaller
set of latent features that have much easier probability density distributions to model and
fit them to a Gaussian distribution, for instance [12] [153].
By providing a probabilistic measure, the VAE can provide an anomaly score. This
means that they eliminate the need to infer a cut-off threshold for the anomaly score but
instead have a continuous anomaly score that follows a Gaussian distribution. A high
anomaly score indicates that this sample deviates significantly from the training data and
hence must be more anomalous in nature [151]. Hence the intuition behind using the
VAE for anomaly detection is that the anomalous data will deviate from the mean of the
distribution i.e., the benign data, which has been represented in a low dimensional space.
Judging based on reconstruction probabilities, the model can spot the anomalous data
easily.
Usually, a forward pass in a VAE encodes an instance into the mean and standard devi-
ation of the latent variable. It then samples from the latent space normal distribution and
decodes the sample into a mean and standard deviation of the output variable. The model
finally draws a sample from the output variable’s distribution to produce the reconstruc-
tion. We can then perform backpropagation after every mini-batch to update our encoder
and decoder parameters (θ and φ), based on our loss function to maximize the likelihood
of our training data. Given x is the input, the reconstructed x′ from a VAE trained on
MNIST [154] looks like what we can see in Figure 4.7, when z, the compressed code learned
in the bottleneck layer, is varied, showcasing the 2-dimensional latent space capturing in-
terpretable and independent factors, more on that is seen in Figure 4.8 where we can see
that one dimension captured smile and the other captured head pose. This suggests that z
dimensions are great feature representations as it captures those interpretable semantics.
The encoder is great for feature representation, and since we can define a threshold for
the reconstruction probability based on the latent space, it can be helpful for classification
or anomaly detection, as it allows inference of q(z|x), the estimated posterior probability
function, also known as the probabilistic encoder. All mathematical symbols are carefully
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Figure 4.6: Variational Auto-Encoder representation. Source: [10]
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Figure 4.7: Reconstructed samples from a VAE trained on MNIST. Source: [12]
defined in ??.
As mentioned before, a VAE does not map the input to a fixed vector like an Auto-
Encoder does, but rather to a distribution pθ where θ stands for the parameter of that
distribution with an optimal, hence real, value θ∗. Given z representing a latent encoding
vector, or compressed code learned in the bottleneck layer, and x ∈ D representing our
original input from the dataset, we are able to define the prior, often approximated with a




the likelihood of generating true data sample given the latent code, also known as proba-
bilistic decoder as :
pθ(x|z) (4.3)
To generate a sample that looks similar to the real input x(i), we sample z(i) from the
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Figure 4.8: Reconstructed samples from a VAE trained on faces. Source: [12]
prior distribution pθ∗(z) and generate x
(i) from the conditional distribution pθ∗(x|z = z(i)).
This allows us to define what is the real or optimal parameter of the distribution θ∗ as
such:






Since it will be the parameter that maximizes the probability of generating x(i), we
can also use log probabilities to change the right hand side into a summation. Trying to
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This involves the simple Gaussian prior and the decoder neural network. The equation
above is not tractable, as we cannot compute every P (x|z) for every z. Calculating pθ(x(i))
is a challenge as it requires to check for all the possible values of z. We can reduce
the value space to facilitate faster search by utilizing an approximation function to the
posterior, qφ(z|x), with a parameter φ, to output a likely z given x. Estimated posterior
qφ(z|x) should very similar to the real posterior pθ(z|x). Hence we work out the log of the
data likelihood to the following equation, equipped with our neural networks
log pθ(x) = Ez∼qφ(z|x) log pθ(x|z)−DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z)) +DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z|x)) (4.6)
If we look closely at the above equation, we can see the first element Ez∼qφ(z|x) log pθ(x|z),
simply tries to reconstruct the input data, and can be provided by the decoder network
and computed through differentiable sampling by the using the reparametrization trick.
The second element DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z)) makes approximate posterior distribution close to
the prior, and is between two Gaussians and hence has a nice closed-form solution. The
third element DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z|x)) is intractable due to p(z|x) being intractable posterior,
but we know this term will be greater than or equal to zero by definition. The first two
elements then form a tractable lower bound that we can take the gradient of and optimize.
We define the loss function as
LVAE(θ, φ) = − log pθ(x) +DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z|x))
= −Ez∼qφ(z|x) log pθ(x|z) +DKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z))




The goal of a VAE in training is to minimize the KL divergence of qφ(z|x) and pθ(x|z)
and pθ(z|x) and as well as the reconstruction probability of x. It generalizes more easily
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than an Auto-Encoder because it works with probability distributions [12]. Numerous
works have proved Variational Auto-Encoders’ high effectiveness in anomaly detectors and
showcased their use [155, 156, 157, 158].
β-VAE [159] is a variation of the VAE with the goal to discover disentangled latent
factors. When each variable in z is sensitive to only one specific generative factor and rela-
tively invariant to other factors, the representation is defined as factorized or disentangled.
Disentangled representations are good for interpretability and generalize to a variety of use
cases. We will also be evaluating β-VAE for our use case.
LBETA(φ, β) = −Ez∼qφ(z|x) log pθ(x|z) + βDKL(qφ(z|x)‖pθ(z)) (4.8)
The above equation represents the β-VAE loss function, and as we can see, the β pa-
rameter can be considered a hyperparameter that, when it exceeds the value of one, applies
a stronger constraint on the latent bottleneck and limits the representation capacity of the
latent space z. In conditionally independent generative factors, keeping them disentangled
is the most efficient representation. Hence the higher β is, the more efficient the latent
encoding becomes and the better the disentanglement. However, a high β may create a
trade-off between reconstruction quality and the extent of disentanglement.
4.3.3 VAE based Anomaly Detection
Due to isotropic Gaussian priors on the latent variables, VAEs give representations with
disentangled factors [160]. Modeling factors as Gaussians allows each dimension in the
representation to be as far as possible from others. Higgins et al. [160] added a regular-
ization coefficient that controls the influence of the prior and defined priors as sequential
models. Unlike an Auto-Encoder, prior gives significant control over how a VAE models
a latent distribution, as expected from a Bayesian model. Precise modeling can capture
better representations, as shown in work presented by Chung et al. [161].
As seen in Algorithm 1 during training, one needs to use both the encoder, fφ, and
decoder,gθ, models to minimize the reconstruction loss as well as latent loss. During testing,
only the encoder is used to get the extracted bottleneck, and then the latent features
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Algorithm 1 VAE anomaly detection. Adapted from [153, 12]
Input: Benign Training Data X, Real-World Data x(i) i = 1, . . . , N, Threshold α
Output: reconstruction probability pθ(x|x’)
1 φ, θ ←train a VAE using the benign Dataset X
2 for i ←1 to N do
3 µz(i, l), σz(i, l) = fθ(z|x(i))
4 Draw L samples from z ∼N(µz(i), σz(i))
5 for l ←1 to L do
6 µx′(i, l), σx′(i, l) = gφ(x|z(i,l))






i|µx′(i, l), σx′(i, l))
8 if reconstruction probability(i) ≤ α then
9 x(i) is an anomaly
10 else
11 x(i) is benign
are sampled following a Gaussian distribution, and its standard deviation and mean are
fed to the decoder to get the reconstruction probability for this data point, which then
can be checked if above a certain threshold, and the data point is judged anomalous or
benign [153, 12].
VAE anomaly detection has been utilized in the cybersecurity context by Bernieri et al.
[162], as well as others as seen in Chapter 3. However, their application in cybersecurity
literature has been limited, and there is still a lot of room for their expansion to different
use cases. The low footprint of VAE in cybersecurity comes as an opportunity to evaluate
the technology in some of the interesting problems in cybersecurity that rely on anomaly
detection. According to Yao et al. [163], VAE-AD performs better than other anomaly
detection approaches such as AE and Kernel Principal Component Analysis (KPCA). We
recognize the importance of feature extraction in anomaly detection, and Auto-Encoder
has been a great feature extractor, arguably the best in the past years. We understand,
however, that AE has limitations in its ability to generalize well and is not able to easily
extrapolate beyond the dataset used in training. These issues are addressed in VAE’s
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capability to capture the underlying distributions of the input data. Thus, they can work
more effectively with smaller training data sets and can yield better anomaly scores than
other feature extractors such as AE and PCA.
4.4 Summary
Anomaly detectors use a very large variety of models, including density-based, Bayesian
networks, fuzzy-logic, deviations from association rules, HMMs, cluster analysis, NN, AE,
LSTMs, SVM, sub-space, or tensor-based outlier detection. The superiority of the VAE
model, however, lies in the generative property, making them cheap, efficient, not data-
hungry, and generalizable. Exploiting the advances in variational Bayes and in probabilistic
inference in general, VAEs and their variants conditional VAEs carry the potential to
outperform most ML-based anomaly detectors [164]. Hence we include VAE, with KNN,





This chapter describes the implementation of approaches presented by Centeno et al. [20]
which is revisited by Buech [13] as well. In this method, a Siamese Convolutional Neural
Network is used along with an OCSVM on the HMOG dataset, in a manner that allows
for a near real-world test case. We present the implemented evaluations for linear models
like PCA, OCSVM, MCD, HBOS, KNN, LOF, and CBLOF, Probabilistic like ABOD, and
ensemble like iForest, and FeatureBag on a few novel and classic experiment configura-
tions reported, span a variety of parameters, scenario steps, and performance metrics, to
satisfy our use cases and comparability requirements. It is important to note that in the
realistic experiments, noted as VALID experiments, the accelerometer was the only data
type used to avoid any fingerprinting of surroundings in the magnetometer or gyroscope
data. We selected our models based on our methodology that was refined and detailed in
Chapter 4. This chapter benefits from the related works and uses the concepts visited in
previous chapters upon which we base our experiments, implementations, and conclusions.




5.1.1 Initial Data-set Explorations
To evaluate our work, we use the HMOG [24] dataset, which provides the smartphone data
collected from many users while they were performing various activities (cf., Section 3.1).
We train and evaluate our models on these sessions. The current state-of-the-art [20]
uses a Siamese Convolutional Neural Network to extract deep features from the inertial
sensors data (magnetometer, accelerometer, and gyroscope) per every one-minute session
and passes it to a One-Class Support Vector Machine to detect if the current user is the
real owner.
The dataset, as outlined in Chapter 3, is used as a de-facto in our research domain,
due to its thorough data collection procedure detailed by its authors [14, 24] and publicly
available for researchers to use [165]. The authors developed a data collection tool for
Android phones to record real-time touch, sensor, and keypress data invoked by user’s in-
teractions with the phone. Data from three usage scenarios on smartphones were recorded:
(1) document reading, (2) text production, (3) navigation on a map to locate a destination.
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Figure 5.1: HMOG sessions duration. Source: [13]
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Figure 5.2: Nine categories of touch or sensor data are recorded in HMOG. Source: [14]
They had 100 volunteers log into the data collection tool, where each subject was
randomly assigned a reading, writing, or map navigation session. For each session, the
subject would either sit or walk to finish the tasks. Each session lasted about 5 to 15
minutes, with a mean of 8.6 minutes as depicted in Figure 5.1. Each subject was asked
to perform 24 different sessions: four sessions reading while sitting, four sessions reading
while walking, four sessions writing while sitting, four sessions writing while walking, four
sessions navigating a map while sitting and four sessions navigating a map while walking.
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In total, each subject contributed about 2 to 6 hours of behavior traits [165]. The data
recorded included streams of accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, raw touch event, a
tap gesture, scale gesture, scroll gesture, fling gesture, and keypress on the virtual keyboard,
as in Figure 5.2. We decided to limit ourselves to initial data features only (accelerometer,
gyroscope, and magnetometer) as discussed in Chapter 4, for reasons pertaining to power,
privacy, and security.
We mainly utilize the software put forward by Buech [15] in their re-implementation
of Centeno et al. [20], data processing step, to achieve the necessary preprocessing and
address several issues with the data set, to enhance its effectiveness in our experiments.
Buech [15] identified sessions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of subject 733162 were missing
accelerometer data and subjects 526319 and 796581 had only 23 sessions instead of 24,
as seen in Figure A.1 and Figure A.6. We hence eliminate subjects 526319, 796581, and
733162 from our working dataset moving forward. Li et al. [69] also reported two subjects
in HMOG to have unusual data, but did not explain further. We assume these are subjects
526319 and 796581. Centeno et al. [20] excluded 10 subjects from the HMOG dataset
for their work. Others [24, 66, 19] did not mention any such data cleaning steps, like
excluding any of the subjects’ data, in their use of HMOG. In an effort to be comparable
with Centeno et al. ’s work [20] seven additional subjects that shown irregularities in data
sizes are removed. Following Buech’s [15] reasoning, we remove subjects 256487, 389015,
and 856401 for having too much data compared to the mean, as seen in Figure A.6 and
219303, 539502, 737973 and 986737 for having too little.
Another issue that is worth noting and will be visited later in our experiments, is the
fact that magnetometer data had some significant outliers, especially on the z-axis, as
shown by Buech [13]. These anomalies were highly related to subjects, and hence can be
used as a shortcut for any model to learn how to spot a certain user. We suspect that’s
due to the environment in which the data was captured. We discuss that in more detail
later on in our evaluations. As for other sensors, accelerometer data was skewed due to
gravity on the y and z axes, and gyroscope data was evenly distributed around zero. We
scrutinize the usefulness of magnetometer in our evaluations moving forward, and will aim
to evaluate our models without that, for a more realistic test case and results. Based
on additional data explorations, we also made the empirical observation that the inertial
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data only is distinctive enough between subjects to allow for an authentication system to
perform reasonably well. As displayed in Figure A.4 and Figure A.5, this is fairly visible
in the visualizations even when eye-balling the data. It is important to note that the
accelerometer alone, also seems to be distinctive enough, as seen in Figure A.2, which will
be validated in our evaluations as well. Further HMOG statistics and observations are to
be found in Appendix A.3.
5.1.2 Data-set Preparations
The CSV files from the dataset had to be converted into tables in a single file of the Hier-
archical Data Format (HDF) to enhance the performance and speed of our experiments on
the supercomputer. It is worthwhile to note that HDF files do not support lazy operations.
Hence, it is not possible to load a data instance only when needed, and the whole dataset
needs to completely fit in memory. If the computer resource does not have enough memory
to support all of HMOG to be loaded into RAM, then a library like Dask [166] might be
the right choice.
Buech [15] proposed an initial data set transformation process that has been adopted
in our work, as well. They collect the inertial sensors (accelerometer, gyroscope, and
magnetometer) data streams at 100Hz frequency, and joined them from all HMOG spread-
sheets. Unnecessary attributes and features were removed, and the results are saved in the
Hierarchical Data Format, for faster data reading operations, as seen in Figure A.3.
As the accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer sensors data is not uniformly sam-
pled, it would generate time shifts between the entries if the data would be joined on row
indices. So the data is transformed into a uniformly sampled time-series and joined under
one table, after re-sampling each sensor data to ten milliseconds and linearly interpolating
the gaps. Sequences with incomplete entries at the beginning and end of their span were
shortened.
Information and metadata about the sessions performed are injected into the data for
every measurement reading the session ID. It identifies whether a session was capturing
the subject reading while sitting, reading while walking, writing while sitting, writing
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while walking, navigating a map while sitting, or navigating a map while walking. We
identified these six task-body modes combinations from the Activity.csv file of the HMOG
dataset, although some gaps in activity descriptions were found. We handled activity
description gaps by simply assuming that every session during data collection had a single
task-body mode combination. Hence, if we have that activity labeled for any time interval
in the session, we can assume the label identifies the entire session’s duration and all of its
measurements.
With regards to sampling, Centeno et al. [20] used both 100Hz and 25Hz for their
Siamese CNN approach, but reported better results for 25Hz. It was unclear how Centeno
et al. achieved that, so Buech [15], during re-implementation, calculated the mean of every
four samples, using a sliding window, as seen in Figure A.3. In general, Centeno et al. [20]
provided very limited information about their data normalization procedure. For instance,
the authors claim to perform channel-wise MINMAX normalization into the zero to one
range, but they do not describe how that was applied. It could be applied to the whole
dataset at once, for every subject individually, for each session, or even for every window
of samples, [13]. Other works, even earlier works by Centeno et al. [16], did not clarify
what normalization techniques were used, if any, making this component’s implementations
ambiguous. Hence, we are left to experiment and yet to find a proper method.
Through Buech’s [13] correspondences with Centeno et al. [16, 13], they concluded that
no differentiation was made between normalization of training and testing sets in Centeno’s
work [16, 20], so as most of the works that use HMOG [24, 14]. Centeno’s et al. [16, 20]
normalization was performed subject-wise for OCSVM, and Siamese CNN. Normalizing
should not happen before splitting the dataset into training and testing subsets. Fitting a
scaler on the training set then normalizing both training and testing sets using the same
scaling parameters would avoid leakage of information between the sets. The same scaling
and normalization need to be used for benign and malicious instances and all subjects alike
since in real-world deployments we can not tell the difference.
Hence following Buech [13], we let normalization become a degree of freedom in our
experiments and aim to find a realistic experiment setting, unlike what we can see in the
research corpus utilizing HMOG as well as other datasets for continuous authentication.
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5.2 Experiments Design
Simply, we mimic scenarios were the model on the owner’s phone is trained to detect the
owner, and then suddenly another user starts using the phone. We try to mimic that
scenario accurately by removing any data that can fingerprint the surrounding, and only
focus on data that signifies the user behaviour, not the transition between users. We also
test every owner against all possible imposters, and with different durations and sessions
time. The data was initially collected on the same phone and was labelled with the user
and the activity, and hence allows us to surgically patch them together smoothly to recreate
experiments that mimic the various threat models and use cases introduce in Chapter 2.
We randomly split, five times using different randomness seeds, the 90 subjects into
a group of sixty subjects representing our validation data set for hyper-parameter tuning
purposes and another group of thirty subjects for testing and performance evaluation
purposes. Our splitting technique is similar to that of Buech [13] to remain comparable.
Figure 5.3: Schema of data splitting for training and testing. A,B,C,D,E,F refer to the six different tasks-body modes
combinations. Every subject is once selected as owner and tested against all remaining subjects. Source: [15]
Both of these sets are further split into training as well as validation or training subsets.
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Similar to what is seen in Figure 5.3, in every experiment a subject is selected, as the device
owner and models are trained on its training sessions. Pairs of owner and impostor samples
from the validation as well as testing sessions are generated and selected for the experiment.
Note that since there are sixty subjects in the validation dataset, we train sixty different
models during hyper-parameter optimization. Once a hyper-parameter value set has been
concluded, then the validation dataset is put aside, and the testing with the testing dataset
begins.
Centeno et al. [16] thoroughly explain how their cross-validation was performed for
training and testing. The cross-validation employed in our evaluations is identical to that
used and re-implemented by Buech [13]. We also added a validation split to allow for a
dedicated hyper-parameter tuning and optimization component in the experiments. It is
important to note that hyper-parameter tuning happens for all subjects i.e., the model
is generalized for as many users as possible. For future work we recommend the usage
of individual specialized models, hyperparameter tuned and optimized for each subject
or owner (cf., Chapter 7). Hyper-parameter tuning for each subject would undoubtedly
enhance the results and is the way to go for a real-world scenario as described in Chapter 4
but makes our work hard to compare to others. Our work prioritized comparability to
the existing body of work, to evaluate a variety of models and specifically what generative
models, like the VAE, can offer to a continuous and implicit authentication system.
There are many questions and variables regarding the experiment design. For instance
what feature set to use of the data available? Are we going to utilize deep feature extrac-
tions or use raw features? Is the collected data presenting a fair evaluation grounds for
the designed solution? We decided to classify all these degrees of freedom regarding the
design, in a table, and logically choose what to experiment with. We tweak them to make
sure we do not have any biases or questionable results in our evaluations. The results are
shown in Table 5.1. The NAIVE setting refers to a configuration where the data is initially
normalized feature-wise per subject using the MINMAX algorithm, before splitting into
training and testing sets. This setting obviously introduces bias into our testing subset
and is not realistic, since the owner and an impostor cannot be distinguished upfront. As
discussed before, normalization needs to take place using the same parameters, and hence
the VALID setting is where the dataset is split into training and testing subsets upfront.
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Degrees of freedom and Initial Settings
Experiment
Name





























Table 5.1: Different initial experiments settings
Then, the normalization scaler is fit using the owner’s training data. Finally, the same
fitted scaler is applied to the testing samples for both owner and impostor.
We exhausted all combinations looking for what effects are observed. Buech [13] indi-
cated that NAIVE-MINMAX-2D, using the accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer
data types, is what is used by other researchers and is how we can benchmark other works,
most importantly that of Centeno et al. [20]. The author also proposed that VALID-
ROBUST-FCN, using only the accelerometer data type, is a more realistic experiment to
see how good are solutions performing in close to realistic scenarios. The arguments were
that NAIVE is not realistic as it had normalized on malicious actor data which really would
not be available during training.
Buech [13] also argued that magnetometer data in HMOG was very different between
different sessions, to the extent that it can fingerprint certain locations the dataset was
collected in and ends up being a shortcut for the model to achieve better performance,
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utilizing this bias. He found that the gyroscope does not allow the model to achieve better
performance and decided to remove it, too. As all related works Chapter 3 had shown
that models perform better in walking body modes since the user profile is easier to detect,
Buech [13] decided to omit the seated body mode from a few experiments, and claimed
that improved the performance.
We were able to validate these claims and tried all the combinations, especially those
missing from his evaluations which were using accelerometer and gyroscope, and accelerom-
eter and magnetometer with all the other combinations. Our results indicate that there is
no gain from including any other data types to the VALID-ROBUST-FCN experiment.
In our work, we found that the two that stood out are one that was composed of
NAIVE-MINMAX and another that was composed of VALID-STD. We evaluated with
deep feature extraction and without, and VAE, as well as KNN, have consistently been
the best two models. We found that KNN is very interpretable and VAE was very fast in
prediction time. Interpretability is not important in the solution design but fast prediction
times were of pivotal importance, as well as being consistently resulting in low EERs and
high accuracy scores across the test in all kinds of experiment settings, with and without
deep feature extractions.
5.2.1 Deep Feature Extraction
Computing features and engineering feature sets involved, traditionally, a lot of manual
labor. As seen in Table A.2,Table A.3, and Table A.4 there are plenty of features a data
scientist can choose for any particular project. Deep feature extraction allows for deep
learning techniques and architectures to learn representations that can replace the feature
engineering process.
In the state-of-the-art ensemble solution presented by Centeno et al. [16] a Siamese
CNN is trained to generate deep features that are passed on to train an OCSVM as an
authentication model. The SCNN network consists of two separate subnetworks, that share
the weights, but each has its input vector and a single output. The output value is derived
from the distance between the output of the subnetworks and relates to the similarity of
the two input vectors.
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In the SCNN pairs of input vectors x(i) and x(j) are paired to a label y(i) that is either
positive, if x(i) and x(j) are related to the same device user, or negative, if x(i) and x(j)
are related to different device users or profiles.
Both CNN’s reduce the dimensionality of x(i) and x(j). These vectors of lower di-
mensionality that result from the siamese network have a distance d between them. Now
contrastive loss function L is given d and y(i) and outputs a high a loss value, only if d
is low and y(i) is less than zero, or d is high, and y(i) is greater than zero. On the other
hand, if either d is low and y(i) is greater than zero, or d is high and y(i) is less than zero
outputted loss becomes low. As indicative of the behavior modeled, the network is forced
to learn aspects of the data that are useful to distinguish between samples from the same
user and samples from different users, effectively doing feature reduction and selection in
an automated fashion.
Once the SCNN is fully trained with both the same user and different user pairs from
a labeled training subset, any one of the identical CNNs is used to output the lower-
dimensional features only. The OCSVM makes use of these for its training and testing.
This completely removes the feature construction tedious process and was shown to improve
the OCSVM performance when compared to training on raw features.
Buech [15] implemented the deep feature extractor in a manner that is slightly different
from what Centeno et al. [16] described to not introduce bias into the model. The key
difference is 50 instead of 60 subjects remained for training the Siamese CNN, as 10 subjects
are used as a validation set for the OCSVM, and still 30 for subjects remain completely
unknown to the whole ensemble until the testing phase. This made sure the experiment
setup is more realistic and the results will be more representative of what can be found in
a real-world deployment.
The SCNN deep feature extractor architecture, shown in Figure A.10, was re-implemented [15]
to match the parameters described by the original authors and Buech in Table A.5. All
layers had Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs) as their activation function, first to implement
ReLUs as activation functions were Krizhevsky et al. [167] in AlexNet, their architecture
was one of the largest convolutional neural networks on the subsets of ImageNet. We en-
courage future work to optimize this architecture and explore deeper models as making a
78
network larger usually improves the performance [168]. When ReLUs caused dying units,
the author has reported exchanging them for exponential linear units.
The way the input to the SCNN was made was through halving all the subjects’ data,
shuffling them, and aligned as pairs for the network. It is important that the SCNN was
implemented in three variations by Buech [15], namely CNN with 2D filters, detailed in
Figure A.10, CNN with 1D filters, detailed in Figure A.8, and FCN with 1D filters, detailed
in Figure A.9. The reasoning is the architecture makes more sense with 1D filters, so the
2D mentioned by Centeno is interpreted as a possible typo, and the last layer is dense is
common instead of flattening the final pooling layer. These variations gave the experiments
more degrees of freedom, as seen in Table A.6.
Further details of the SCNN implementation are made available in the original authors’
publication [20] and the recent re-implementation [15].
The outlier detection models we choose to test in the experiments are all of the ones dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. A brief description of those is in Appendix A.5. Their implementation
details are in Chapter 6.
5.3 Results
As we conducted more than ten experiment settings (VALID FCN ROBUST, VALID FCN
STD, VALID FCN MINMAX, NAIVE ROBUST 2D, NAIVE STD 2D, NAIVE MINMAX
2D, VALID ROBUST, VALID STD, VALID MINMAX, NAIVE ROBUST, NAIVE STD,
NAIVE MINMAX) across our more than ten models with numerous hyper-parameters and
feature set combinations (accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer), we generated lots of
results. Commented and clean code base and data from these available on our GitHub
repository [169]. In this section, we discuss and present the main highlights and relevant
insights.
To evaluate the authentication performance, cross-validation was performed using the
testing subset, which involved thirty subjects who have not previously included invali-
dation and have never seen by the models or the data pipeline. The experiment results
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are interpreted using calculated EERs, and performance accuracies for all the intricate
owner–impostor scenarios that play out in these cross-validations. In each cross-validation,
one of the 30 subjects is treated as the device owner and only 18 of their sessions are used
to train the model. Six different owner sessions, each with a unique task body mode com-
bination of the owner, are then tested against six sessions of some other user, playing the
impostor, with an equal number of testing data instances and samples. This process is
repeated for all 29 imposters, against any single owner. A total of 870 such crafted testing
scenarios were simulated. To improve the robustness of our results, this evaluation was
repeated five different times using different random seeds. The presented results are the
average of the five independent trials, or 4530 testing scenarios, each consisting of six tests
from an owner and six tests from an imposter. This means that every owner got to have
29 imposters attack their phone for six sessions five times each.
As detailed in Section 5.2, the NAIVE approach to normalization was initially per-
formed, both on the entire data and individually for every subject. However, in the VALID
approach, the normalization scaler was fitted on the training data of the owner only and
then applied to transform the testing data for both the owner and the imposter.
5.3.1 Initial Results
Our initial results are based on the NAIVE MINMAX 2D experiment, where normalization
occurs naively and simplistically. In this set-up, testing dataset values are MINMAX
scaled, and the SCNN uses the 2D CNN implementation discussed in Section 5.2.1. The
codebase for most of the experiment instruments was open-sourced by Buech [13] in their
implementation and validation of the state-of-the-art ensemble model proposed by Centeno
et al. [16]. Their self-reported results, under the NAIVE MINMAX 2D setting, are
14.70% EER and 90.00% accuracy, which are produced by running an ensemble of the
author OCSVM model after deep feature extraction using a Siamese Convolutional Neural
Network. We aim to enhance these scores, thanks to the properties generative models
inherently possess, as discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.
Our results were based on running the following models through the NAIVE MINMAX
2D experiment: VAE, β-VAE, KNN, OCSVM, author OCSVM (proposed by Centeno et
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al. [20] and reimplemented by Buech [15])1, ABOD, CBLOF, FeatureBag, HBOS, IForest,
LOF, PCA. Note that we experimented with different VAE variations and configurations in
this step, to find the best architecture and hyper-parameters to proceed with. We also con-
ducted hyper-parameter tuning for all models, for both the VALID-FCN-ROBUST and the
NAIVE-MINMAX-2D experiments. This was done via the Random Search algorithm [170]
which is faster and more efficient than the Grid Search algorithm [171]. As discussed in
Chapter 2, EER is the preferred metric for this study, but model accuracy is also included
to improve comparability. Our experiment results are summarized in Figure 5.5 and Fig-
ure 5.4, in both metrics. The timing results for the experiments are shown in Figure 5.6.
The results shown under each model, represent the best possible performance reachable by
the model when it is optimized for the experiment settings.
1OCSVM refers to an OCSVM model that we hyper-parameter tuned for optimal performance in our
experiments, while author OCSVM refers to the model hyper-parameter tuned by Centeno et al. [20] and
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Based on the initial results, we disqualify most of the models for being slow, measured
by inference time, or having sub-optimal performance, measured by EER and accuracy.
This leaves us with VAE, ABOD, KNN, LOF, and PCA only, as the most promising five
models, as in Figure 5.7. The initial results show us that although all models are performing
relatively well, the models mentioned above achieve the best mean accuracy and EER with
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Figure 5.8: Previously reported testing accuracy and EER of the state-of-the-art and 5 best models in 2 different experiment
settings.
In Figure 5.9 and in Figure 5.8, the impact of the deep feature extraction step using the
Siamese Convolutional Neural Network on the performance of these promising models are
analyzed. It is apparent that the usage of such a resource-intensive step causes significant
performance gains from some models, like the OCSVM, but negligible performance gains
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Figure 5.9: Testing accuracy and EER of the state-of-the-art and 5 best models in 2 different experiment settings.
It is worth noting that the loss due to the removal of the deep feature extractor is only
1% in accuracy for the 2 layered VAE, with 16 neurons in the first layer and 1 neuron in
the second, experiment while it ranges between 4% to 20% in other models, and that can
be attributed to the VAE’s inherent dimensionality reduction capabilities, thanks to its
autoencoder and generative models roots.
Under the same experiment settings (NAIVE MINMAX 2D), while SCNN and OCSVM
ensemble reached 14.7% EER and 90% accuracy, our proposed model achieved 11.71% EER
and 92.52% accuracy when using a VAE with only 2 layers of size 1 and 16, respectively,
amassing a 3% gain in EER, our most prominent performance metric. In these experiments,
we also found a KNN configuration that produced 11.87% EER and 92.44% accuracy.
ABOD also achieved 13.77% EER and 91% accuracy.
However, the VAE had a mean scoring time of 0.005 seconds and negligible variance.
Furthermore, it is worth noting, as seen in Figure 5.10, that the VAE is 8-10 times faster
in scoring than the KNN or the ABOD, who also have good results. That is comparable
to the OCSVM scoring time without the Deep feature extractor SCNN. We recognize that
inference speed is very important in this solution. The user experience and utility of the
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solution are highly affected by the scoring time, and resource limitations are common on
smartphones.
The experiments demonstrate how removing the deep feature extractor, being the Fully
Connected Network (FCN) or the 2D network in these experiments, helps us better un-
derstand the strengths and flaws of the anomaly detection models. The best and most
consistent model across all experiments so far, from accuracy, EER, time mean, and vari-
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Figure 5.10: Inference time results of VAE, KNN, and ABOD in seconds.
5.3.3 Observations and Improvements
An indication that the models trained on MINMAX scaled data are learning general dif-
ferences of the distributions as opposed to the intended learned difference of patterns of
the actual user movements, is seen in the results of walking only body modes scenarios
being the lowest instead of the highest accuracies, which is observed in experiments that
use another scaler (e.g., ROBUST or STANDARD), an effect reported by Buech [13]. We
turn towards the experiment setting yet again and start questioning whether the VALID-
FCN-ROBUST performance can be enhanced, by perhaps changing the scaler. In better-
controlled datasets, magnetometer, gyroscope, and other data sources like WiFi or back-
ground noise can be used in continuous and implicit authentication systems, however in
HMOG fingerprinting physical locations subjects were in, and hence, their recorded activ-
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ity sessions is a concern. We remove any data that can be used by the model to fingerprint
sessions and ROBUST scale any data we feed the model.
VALID normalization is more realistic than NAIVE since we do not have the attacker
data to normalize on in a real-life deployment. An accelerometer is also better than a
gyroscope and magnetometer, and any combination of them is worse than an accelerometer
alone as we have found within our extensive set of experiments, even when ROBUST scaling
is used. However, since ROBUST scaling was used to remove the outliers fingerprinting a
small number of sessions (based on unique magnetometer values) that were causing the bias
in the models, we aim to validate the need for ROBUST scaling when only accelerometer
data, which is assumed to not fingerprint physical locations of data collection, is being
utilized.
We now move on to validate why this scaling method was used in particular. To begin
with, we look at scaling methods commonly used, summarized in Table 5.2.
Function Range Mean Distribution When to Use Definition Notes
MinMaxScaler
0 to 1 default,
can override
varies Bounded
Use first unless have
theoretical reason to
need stronger medicine.
Add or substract a constant.
Then multiply or divide by
another constant.
MinMaxScaler subtracts the
mimimum value in the column
and then divides by the
difference between the original
maximum and original minimum.
Preserves the shape of the original distribution.
Does not reduce the importance of outliers.
Least disruptive to the information in the
original data. Default range for MinMaxScaler
is 0 to 1.
RobustScaler varies varies Unbounded
Use if have outliers and
do not want them to have
much influence.
RobustScaler standardizes a feature
by removing the median and dividing
each feature by the interquartile range.
Outliers have less influence than with





When need to transform
a feature so it is close
to normally distributed.
StandardScaler standardizes a feature
by removing the mean and dividing
each value by the standard deviation.
Results in a distribution with a standard
deviation equal to 1 (and variance equal to 1).
If you have outliers in your feature (column),
normalizing your data will scale most of the
data to a small interval.
Normalizer varies 0 Unit norm Rarely.
An observation (row) is normalized
by applying l2 (Euclidian)
normalization. If each element were
squared and summed, the total
would equal 1. Could also specify l1
(Manhatten) normalization.
Normalizes each sample observation (row),
not the feature (column)!
Table 5.2: Table of commonly used scaling functions
When using the MINMAX scaler, the maximum and minimum of the distribution
have a considerable effect on the normalization, which linearly transforms all values into
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a provided range (e.g., zero to one). This makes the normalization sensitive to the many
outliers in the dataset. These outliers and their distributions are easily picked up on by the
models as a user data session fingerprint but do not signify the user behaviors or movement.
We set to explore how the STANDARD scaler can impact our experiment results. In the
upcoming section, we explore how the top five models and the baseline OCSVM perform
when the data is normalized using the STD scaler rather than the MINMAX or robust.
We also encourage future researchers to explore Power Transformer [172], Quantile
Transformer [173] with Gaussian or uniform outputs, and Normalizer [174] scalers. The
Power Transformer scaler makes the data distribution fit better to the Gaussian distribution
to stabilize variance and minimize skewness as much as it can. The Quantile Transformer,
on the other hand, applies a non-linear transformation such that the probability density
function (PDF) of the data will be mapped to a uniform or Gaussian distribution. The
Normalizer scaler is very different than both in its being a method for rescaling the vector
so that every sample would have a unit norm, independently of the distribution of the
samples [175].
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Figure 5.11: PCA visualization of the deep features generated by the original SCNN with 2D
filters and using the ROBUST scaler. Source: [13]
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Figure 5.12: PCA visualization of the deep features generated by the original SCNN with 2D
filters and using the MINMAX scaler. Source: [13]
The two-dimensional PCA visualization of the deep features, extracted by the SCNN
2D network when using the MINMAX scaler, is shown in Figure 5.12. When compared to
the features extracted when using the ROBUST scaler, displayed in Figure 5.11, it is clear
that MINMAX scaling allows the models to short-cut the behavioural indicators learning
process and have unrealistic performances on HMOG. These inflated performances are
simply not indicators of true learning of user-specific behavioural indicators within the
data.
Another thing to notice here is that the original OSCVM improved from 65.3% accuracy
and 36.8% EER when using data that is ROBUST scaled to 67.4% and 33.36% ERR using
data MINMAX scaled when using the VALID experiment setting and the FCN deep feature
extractor. This improvement is due to the fact that MINMAX highlights outliers and gives
an unfair advantage to the models, as they can fingerprint sessions, rather than capturing
behavioural identifiers in the data.
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5.3.4 Final Results
We start by introducing the new experiment setting that uses VALID normalization logic,
along with STANDARD (std) scaling in place of robust, both with and without the deep
feature extraction step. The results presented in Figure 5.13 suggest that this method is
beneficial to the performance of most promising models. STANDARD scaling, as we saw
in Table 5.2, removes the mean and scales the data to unit variance. accelerometer data
does not suffer from too many random outliers like other sensors data, and hence using
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Figure 5.14: Testing EER of the state-of-the-art and the top 5 models in 6 different experiment settings.
We observe the state-of-the-art and the 5 highest-performing models according to the
experiments in Section 5.3.1:
• VAE (Reconstruction-Probabilistic Model)
• KNN (Proximity/Distance Based Model)
• ABOD (Probabilistic Model)
• PCA (Linear Model)
• LOF (Proximity/Distance Based Model)
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Figure 5.15: Testing accuracy and EER of the state-of-the-art and 5 best models in 2 different experiment settings.
The results of four VALID STD experiments can be seen in Figure 5.15. We find that
the ensemble of PCA and SCNN with the FCN architecture has a great performance.
However, due to the deep feature extraction’s high computational cost, we decide to look
into the experiment variant where the heavy, complicated, and slow deep feature extractor
is no more present. As displayed in Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17, we study the PCA
performance without deep features, relying only on the STANDARD scaler.
The PCA results over more than 4000 tests for EER, F1 score, accuracy, and inference
time are: EER mean is 35.86% (standard deviation 17.05%), and with 95% confidence,
it falls between 35.35% and 36.36%. F1 mean is 50.21% (standard deviation 33.67%),
and with 95% confidence it falls between 49.21% and 51.22%. Accuracy mean is 65.96%
(standard deviation is 19.06%) and with 95% confidence, it falls between 65.40% and
66.53%. Inference time mean is 18.4 milliseconds (standard deviation 1.9 milliseconds)
and with 95% confidence, it falls between 18.3 and 18.4 milliseconds.
The VAE results over more than 4000 tests for EER, F1 score, accuracy, and inference
time are: EER mean is 34.53% (standard deviation 15.92%) and with 95% confidence, it
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Figure 5.16: Testing EER and inference time (milliseconds) of PCA and VAE models under the newly proposed experiment
setting.
with 95% confidence it falls between 62.13% and 63.76%. The accuracy mean is 67.63%
(standard deviation 19.26%) and with 95% confidence, it falls between 67.06% and 68.20%.
Inference time mean is 16.2 milliseconds (standard deviation 2.9 milliseconds) and with 95%
confidence, it falls between 16.1 and 16.3 milliseconds.
We compute F1, accuracy, EER, and time delay to compare the PCA and the VAE
models under the VALID normalization approach and STANDARD scaling method. It
is apparent that VAE is outperforming PCA, and the F1 score of PCA is an order of
magnitude lower. This confirms that VAE is the superior method for this use case.
In Figure 5.18, we present the best performing models according to our extensive eval-
uations under the two important experiment settings for continuous and implicit authenti-
cation. NAIVE MINMAX represents a setting comparable to what is being used by other
academic works, and VALID STD represents a setting comparable to real-life deployments
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We found the best setting for VAE in NAIVE MINMAX 2D was that of the following
configurations:
• Number of layers in encoder: 2
• Number of neurons in first layer: 1
• Number of neurons in second layer: 16
• Activation function to use for hidden layers: hyperbolic tangent function
• Activation function to use for output layer: Soft-max
• Optimizer = stochastic gradient descent
• Loss function: mean squared error
• L2 regulaizer = 0.5
• Dropout rate: .25
• Epochs = 100
• Batch size: 32
• Coefficient of beta VAE regime: 1.5
• Maximum capacity of a loss bottle neck: 1
The architecture is detailed in the codebase and in Appendix A.1.
The best setting for ABOD is
• Number of neighbors to use by default for k neighbors queries: 10
• Method: Only consider a number of neighbors of training points
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The best setting for KNN is
• Number of neighbors used for k neighbors queries: 5
• use the distance to the kth neighbor as the outlier score
• Range of parameter space to use by default for radius neighbors queries: 1
• Leaf size passed to BallTree: 30
• Metric used for the distance computation: Minkowski with euclidean distance l2
The best setting for PCA is
• The eigenvalues are used in score computation
• Perform standardization first to convert data to zero mean and unit variance
The best setting for LOF is
• Number of neighbors used for k neighbors queries: 20
• Leaf size passed to BallTree or KDTree:30
• Metric used for the distance computation: Minkowski with euclidean distance l2
The best setting for the state of the art Author OCSVM, as reported in [13] is
• kernel type: rbf
• An upper bound on the fraction of training errors and a lower bound of the fraction
of support vectors (nu): 0.110
• Kernel coefficient (gamma): 59.636
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5.4 Discussion
We expected our results to be more conservative than some of those reported by other works
due to our smaller training dataset caused by our additional validation split to support
our extensive hyper-parameter tuning, our more extensive cross-validation, and the prepro-
cessing and normalization steps taken to avoid data contamination, in our efforts to make
our evaluations comparable to real-life deployments of such a system. However, our results
outperform many of the reported numbers in the domain, as covered Chapter 3. The work
presented by Centeno et al. [20] reported 97.8% accuracy on their SCNN and OCSVM
ensemble and 86.9% accuracy on their OCSVM. However, despite extensive efforts, includ-
ing correspondences with Centeno, by Buech [13] for reproducing the closed-source model,
they could not reach above 90% accuracy in their re-implementation of the ensemble and
86.3% in the OCSVM case. It is unclear why the SCNN implemented by Buech is unable
to perform similarly to Centeno’s, although it has an identical architecture and parameter
set. In the interest of transparency, we public-ally release all relevant software, including
our VAE architecture to prevent such issues in reproducing our evaluations.
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, an EER of 15% means that in 85% of the times,
the authorized user would be authenticated in a non-intrusive manner, without the need
for active co-operation. This also entails that in 85% of the events where CIA authenticates
the user, it is the correct person who gets authenticated. This, of course, is assuming the
result is transferable to real-world scenarios and the experiment settings are representative
of the real-world circumstances.
Our hypothesis that the VALID setting, representing a real-world deployment scenario,
in which the normalization scaler was trained only on training data and is then used as-
is to scale imposter and owner data instances during testing, causes a significant drop
in performance compared to results from experiments using the NAIVE setting, where
the scaler is given access to all data including the testing subset. The NAIVE setting
additionally introduces bias by applying user-wise MINMAX normalization on all data
and outliers.
Magnetometer data introduces bias because it captures data from the surrounding
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environment and in theory, does not represent the device movement patterns as much as
the other sensors.
VAE and KNN are outperforming all other models consistently, with VAE having a
clear edge in performance, consistency, as well as being up to ten times faster in inference
time. The common experiment used in the domain is NAIVE MINMAX with the deep
feature extraction 2D variant as well as no deep feature extractor variant. The VAE can
reach 11.71% EER and 92.52% accuracy as well as 12.97% EER and 91.39% accuracy
without any deep feature extraction. Hence, we conclude that the VAE is a good fit for
the problem statement and offers a performance gain as well as is a fast, reliable, and
consistent model that can do its feature extraction. Most importantly, it shines in the
VALID experiments under both ROBUST and STANDARD scalings which clean the data
from any fingerprints that the models can use to circumvent the learning process.
5.4.1 Empowering the Edge
The edge defined in this use case as the smartphone is growing more powerful by the day.
Smartphones today have incredible resources, similar to those of computers a few years ago,
and are perfectly able to run their analysis. This is very important for privacy concerns
over data being sent to the cloud, resource efficiency with lower bandwidth utilization,
cheaper business models, and more efficient analysis. Its also important that in the hand
over to authority figures threat model (B), we saw how border services are instructed to
disable internet access for a variety of reasons, and if the solution was running on the cloud
it would not have been able to detect and respond to the threat.
We chose fast models that are simple and easy-to-access data types that are available
on all smartphones to allow for the solution to be as generalizable as possible and work
efficiently. We were able to run our model on TensorFlow Lite, an open-source deep
learning framework for edge AI, and packaged the data collection, data streaming, model
training, and exporting mechanism in our open source repository. We also included all
the experiments, models, utility code, implementations on both IOS and Android (cf.,
Chapter 6), and notes in our repository to lower the barrier of entry to this research
domain. We hope our contributions can improve reproducibility and encourage openness,
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Our experiments are all available as open-source on GitHub, the HMOG dataset processing
modules we used have also been made available. We provide a Python environment that was
used in Jupyter Ipython to run our experiments as documented in the notebooks provided.
The easily followed notebooks allow the reader to understand how to reproduce the results
very easily and how they fit into the logical flow of the work. These notebooks are also used
to produce visualizations for the various results found in the experiments. Data acquisition
and machine learning applications have been developed for IOS and Android and open-
sourced. Software required to operate the experiments on a supercomputer has also been
made available to shorten the development cycle and lower the barriers to entry for other
researchers to adopt our code base and contribute further to the continuous and implicit
authentication domain that will make our smart devices infused hyper-connected future
more secure, convenient and efficient.
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6.1 Solution Code Base
6.1.1 Experiments code-base
The opensource project is found under a publicly accessible GitHub organization named
UW − CIA, in reference to the University of Waterloo and Continuous and Implicitly
Authentication [169]. Under the experiments repository, there are three sections, similar
to and adopted from Buech’s [15]. The data section under the data folder hosts the HDF5
format of HMOG dataset, as well as other raw, interim, processed, or external data formats.
Appropriate data transformations, processing, and loading modules are found under
the source folder src. Necessary data visualizations, explorations, and modeling as well as
all kinds of experiments and evaluations are accessible under the Jupyter notebooks folder
notebooks. Jupyter notebooks were the best vehicle to showcase our work since they offer
clarity and explainability, unlike any other format, by combining source code, documenta-
tion, and output. Necessary third-party code and libraries needed are documented in the
environment.yml file. It has metadata denoting the versions of Python and other modules
and can easily be used to reproduce the whole programming environment, and accelerate
the reproducibility of our work, Anaconda Python distribution or Python pip processes
this file. The enclosed documentation README.md contains a detailed description of all
necessary steps needed to utilize the repository, and I am going to be supportive of using
the Issues feature on GitHub that allows anyone to ask me questions, publicly, relating
to the usage of the codebase or even improve upon the codebase.
To improve reproducibility and re-usability, all the models utilized existing common
software libraries like TensorFlow, and ScikitLearn [176, 177]. The codebase was cleaned
and comments, as well as read-me files, were added where relevant.
6.1.2 Data Collection, Data Cloud Streaming, and AI at Edge
As part of our effort and commitment to make our domain and project closer to real-
world deployments, we built and open-sourced a data collection and streaming application
103
that works on IOS and Android devices; it utilizes a software framework put together by
Patton et al. [178], in MIT. The data acquisition is very simple. The application reads
the data from the sensors in real-time as they become available and sends the relevant
measurements in real-time to the cloud in an encrypted channel and a secured fashion. In
our implementation of the receiving cloud, we kept it simple and had the results received
by a spreadsheet hosted on a file sharing service known as Google Drive, but a simple
database or even a data lake or warehouse can be utilized as well. Once the data is in the
cloud the code base for the experiments can be utilized to run the whole set of experiments,
explorations, and tests on the collected data. The data collection module was tested and
is functional.
If a model is chosen, we also built and open-sourced the means for deploying any of the
models we presented, especially the VAE, to run on IOS and Android devices, as well as on
embedded devices commonly used in the Internet of Things applications. Our implementa-
tions are built on top of a software framework built by David et al. [179], in Google. There
were challenges faced during the implementation of the VAE model, specifically, due to it
being relatively new. For instance, to get one of the VAE implementations to run on tensor
flow lite, the experimental interface OpsSet needs to be called, and targetspec as well as
targetops flags need to be set to allow for certain operation and built-ins in the model
transformation during the run time of the exported model. New or unpopular models are
usually relatively harder to implement compared to more common classical models, due to
the scarcity of reference implementations, architectures, and learning resources. We ended
up with two implementations to support two different VAE implementations at the edge,
one based on the PYOD software library while the other is based on the more common
Tensorflow software library. Both implementations were tested at the edge and both are
functional.
6.2 Solution Computing Resources
During the experiments, we were fortunate to access the Niagara supercomputer, part of
an initiative called Compute Canada to support academic intensive computing needs. As
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part of this work, we had to develop a set of software to allow for better management
of the data, experiments, and working jobs for the supercomputer system, managed by a
software platform known as slum. All the relevant code is made available under our repo





Besides our detailed suggestions across the chapters that would allow future works to con-
tribute to the domain strategically in different categories of the work from general approach
and modeling Chapter 4, to evaluations Chapter 5 and implementations Chapter 6, we also
would like to give high-level directions worthy of further explorations.
For those who tackle this domain in the future, the most impactful investigations in
our opinion are the following:
• Extensively hyperparameter tune all the anomaly detector models that were not
covered, e.g., HMM, Bayesian Nets, or fuzzy logic, to find the optimal configuration
for each using the whole HMOG dataset mean score as your optimization factor for
every possible experiment configuration
• Repeat the previous point but this time to find the optimal configuration for each
using one specific user at a time from HMOG dataset mean score as your optimization
factor, so the models are fit for each user
• Train and test a VQ-VAE (Vector Quantised-Variational AutoEncoder) [180]. Vector
Quantisation-VAE learns a discrete latent variable by the encoder. VQ maps k
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Figure 7.1: TD VAE state-space model as a Markov Chain. Source: [10]
dimensional vectors into a finite set of vectors in a process similar to that of KNN:
the optimal centroid code vector that a sample should be mapped to is the one with
minimum Euclidean distance. [10]
• Train and test a VQ-VAE-2 [181]. VQ-VAE-2 [181] is a two-level hierarchical VQ-
VAE combined with a self-attention auto-regressive model.
• Train and test a TD-VAE [182]. Temporal difference VAE, as in Section 7.1 was built
for sequential data and relies on state-space models, belief states which encode all
past states, and jumpy prediction or predicting states several steps further into the
future.
• Anomaly detection models based on meta learning [183, 184, 185, 186, 187], self
supervised [188, 189] and reinforcement learning [190, 191, 192] are emerging and
might be worth exploring. However they are very resource intensive.
• Evaluate multi-modal to improve reliability [193]. Though the base data should be
inertial, areas like touch, gesture, wearables [194], etc. can be used as the privacy
posture, and the user permissions appetite allow in certain cases the system to access
more revealing data sources.
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• Differential privacy might be used if the user allows for cloud-based training
• Explore federated and split learning for model improvement and collaborative learn-
ing
• Explore third-party integrations that can allow for contextual awareness that helps
set a threshold for suspicion in different use cases, locations, and day times
• Collect a better data set that is bigger and represents real-world scenarios and attacks
• As discussed in Chapter 5 a study of Normalizer, Power and Quantile transformers
scalers can add to the design of the standard experiment settings used in the body
of research
• As discussed in Chapter 3 detecting the user activity first (walking, or sitting) then
using a specifically optimized inference model, and collaborating with relevant third
party systems can improve reliability in real-world scenarios
• Use an absolute coordinate system by removing the gravity vector from the accelerom-
eter to calculate a spatial orientation and coordinate system for the device which can
be a good feature to add
One of the biggest issues in the continuous and implicit authentication domain is the
reproducibility of the work. Information on the bigger picture is usually well presented
but finer details, usually found in code, and necessary for reproducing the results and
approach are almost impossible to find publicly available and highly unlikely to be acquired
through correspondence. Such details like standardization, normalization, data cleaning,
preprocessing, resampling, and splitting as well as model hyperparameters and experiment
cross-validation details are usually guessed by later works and left for future researchers
speculation. It is the case because a research paper format does not allow for too many,
commonly forgettable, details to be shared and prioritization of main methodologies and
bigger picture approaches is commonplace. We argue that open-sourcing the codebase
should become the standard in such works. It is, unfortunately, the case that none of
the related works, but Buech [15] have made their source code public, and the ones we
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tried reaching and even corresponded with like Shen et al. [19] refused to share data or
code. As covered in Chapter 2 this makes the studies harder to compare and learn from
as the reader is left unsure which of the many degrees of freedom, e.g., dataset, metrics,
experiment settings, cross-validation, or data preprocessing contributed to the performance
and results reported. Our work hopes to be a step closer to a standard evaluation and
deployment environment and the code and our contributions are all open-sourced [169] and
thoroughly described in Chapter 4.
The domain does not only need openness and standards for sharing work, but also
a better publicly available dataset than HMOG. HMOG is by far the best dataset right
now for this domain for comparability, as extensively described in Chapter 3, but it does
come with a few critical flaws. HMOG limits our work’s transfer-ability to real-world
deployments due to it being recorded in a controlled setting with no attack scenarios.
This makes the sessions deviate considerably from real-world scenarios and does not aid
in making the great wealth of work in this area transferable to real-world applications. It
would be an amazing feat if a dataset is collected with attack scenarios based on the real
threat models and use cases described in Chapter 4. Such a contribution could transform
this domain and enable more commercialization of the plethora of great innovations in it,
as highlighted in Chapter 3.
It is worth exploring to integrate the microenvironment sensing [195] to analyze what
activity the user is doing or where the phone is (e.g., right thigh pocket, left chest pocket,
purse, strapped to the arm, in hand). This would allow the anomaly detector to assess what
activity is being performed. In its current state, the anomaly detector will have labeled
ground truth data to support every activity there is and will utilize contextual awareness
through third-party applications to refine its assessments but adding this kind of situational
awareness via environment and activity sensing can add to the overall solution.
Because the most straightforward way of improving the performance of deep neural




We have introduced the domain and briefly listed our contributions in Chapter 1. We have
assessed the feasibility of only using inertial sensor data, which were covered in Chapter 2,
from mobile devices to classify the current user as either the owner or an unauthorized
imposter, continuously and implicitly. A framework and methodology were proposed, in
Chapter 4 that not only modeled threats and scenarios but also integrated current third
party applications, technologies, and investments in information technology concaveness
in an enterprise, campus, military, or home setting towards a more comprehensive and
collaborative continuous authentication system. Our work also delivered a cross-study,
in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5, comparing various classic and new machine learning ap-
proaches under various, and reproducible controlled experiments based on an opensource
framework [15] with a public dataset [24], and highlighted the use case for generative models
and their inherent strengths in such systems and threat models, use cases and attack sce-
narios. In our extensive literature review, in Chapter 3 , we identified that this domain did
not have a similar machine learning models comparative study other than one in 2017 [19]
and another in 2014 [196], which was published by our lab under the direction of Prof. Urs
Hengartner. The domain had one major flaw: severely complicated reproducibility, which
we addressed by choosing to work with public data and releasing our experiments, models,
and implementations, as well as propose a template and a standard for other works to fol-
low in reporting their metrics, and experiments. Our pivotal work on evaluating generative
models, allowed us to note that GANs and fm-GANS, might not be great for unsupervised
and semi-supervised learning since too many labels are needed for the excessive hyper-
parameter tuning needed, while on the other hand, other generative models, like VAEs
in particular, show promising potential in semi-supervised outlier detection with the data
and should be studied in a greater depth as shown in Chapter 5 and suggested by other
researchers [121]. The VAE outperforms all other models in our various experiments, some
of which are proposed by us to mimic realistic scenarios more closely, in this continuous and
implicit authentication system and paves the way for generative models into this domain,
for the first time. Our work replaces the need for heavy deep feature extraction, as well
as manual feature engineering, by relying on shallow variational autoencoder models, that
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have inherent probabilistic and dimensionality reduction capabilities. Our work also open
sources multiple Android and IOS implementations, in Chapter 6, needed to utilize the
novel contributions in the real-world, as well as stream sensor data to the cloud to allow
for cloud-based training as well as on-device training, and advocates for openness in this
domain to further its transfer-ability into the real-world. The reasoning for every decision
from threat modeling to model selection to cross-validation and data normalization and
cleaning was given with thorough explanations and references to the existing body of work.
“By securing, I mean: building systems to remain dependable in the face of
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K. S. Balagani, “A multimodal data set for evaluating continuous authentication
performance in smartphones,” in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on
Embedded Network Sensor Systems. Memphis Tennessee: ACM, Nov. 2014, pp.
358–359. [Online]. Available: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2668332.2668366
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A.2 Human Activity Recognition
Based on accelerometer and gyroscope data to detect complex activities, Johnson et al.
[197] classify bad driving, and Dai et al. [198] have succeeded to classify drunk driving.
Kunze et al. [199] and Abdulla et al. [54] have leveraged magnetometer data along with
accelerometer data to detect the location of the device on the human body. Weiss et al.
[200] proposed a health monitoring app called “Actitracker” that utilizes motion sensors
and feeds them into a Random Forest classifier. Their solution uses a threshold set by the
user for their detection and measures daily user activities. Gouveia et al. [201] assessed
another app called “Habito”, and concluded that historical logs of the user activity sensor
data are not useful to the user and should be deleted on a daily basis for security and
privacy reasons. Falling detection is a big use case for the health monitoring and human
activity recognition domain. “FallAlarm” is an app presented by Zhao et al. [202] that was
developed to detect human users falling and alarm their contacts. It is built on top of many
contributions in the domain, like those of Fahmi et al. [203] and Kansiz et al. [204], which
use time, frequency, and wavelet features for fall detection in their semi-supervised and
supervised works, respectively. Similarly, he authors of “MobiFall” [205] have evaluated
multiple models to detect the forward falls using hands, forward falls using knees, side-ward
falls, and backward falls with up to 99% accuracy. Lee et al. [206], Lorincz et al. [207],
and others had also contributed diseases classification models (Parkinson’s, strokes, and
epilepsy) and frameworks using machine learning which leverage motion data for detecting
patients’ movement patterns. Motion sensors from smartwatches and other gadgets have
also been utilized in this domain. Weiss et al. [208] and Ramos et al. [209] used motion
data from smartwatch to detect different activities and whether an individual is intoxicated,
or drunk, with high accuracies. The utilization of these gadgets are outside the scope of
our work, as we are focused on making the solution applicable to as many users as possible.
Nevertheless, if gadgets do exist, they can be integrated into our framework for additional
contextual awareness as covered in Chapter 2. Academic works have used motion sensors
to locate users indoor with great accuracies, classify diseases, detect imperfections unique
to every device, sense human characteristics and emotions, detect activities and the status
of human users surrounding the device, and authenticate users via a variety of parameters
141
and techniques. More on those in health monitoring, use status indoor localization, device
fingerprinting, personal traits, and keystroke authentication using motion data is available
in a recent survey published by Masoud et al. [55].
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read + sit read + walk write + sit write + walk map + sit map + walk
Figure A.1: HMOG sessions categories and total count per subject. Adapted from [15]
Figure A.2: HMOG accelerometer data between subjects and walking and sitting settings. Adapted from [15]
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Figure A.3: Initial data preparation procedure along with corresponding python software modules. Adapted from [15]
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Figure A.5: HMOG inertial data pairwise relationships for three subjects. Adapted from [15]
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Feature Set Number of resulting features Description
Mean 3 Average value
Median 3 Most often occurring values
Minimum 3 Lowest value
Maximum 3 Highest value
Range 3 Difference between highest and lowest values
Variance 3 Spread of values around their mean
STD 3 Standard deviation of the values
Kurtosis 3 Tailedness of value distribution
Skewness 3 Measure of symmetry of distribution
SMA 3 Signal Magnitude Area (SMA) or signal energy
Summed SMA 1 SMA of the three axis signals combined
Quantiles 3·x Separating partitions in the values distribution
IQR 3 Interquartile Range (IQR)
Cross-mean Rate 3 Fluctuation of the signal
Table A.2: The time domain’s commonly computed features and number of resulting features per a three-axis sensor. Adapted
from [13, 19]
Figure A.6: HMOG samples count per subject. Adapted from [15]
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Entropy Dispersion of signal
Peek occurrences Number of peeks occurred
Time between peeks Average time between peeks
Slope between peeks the steepness and direction of the peeks
Peek to peek signal value
difference between the maximum amplitude
in the negative direction and in the positive direction
Max Latency longest interval between two consecutive iterations
Min Latency shortest interval between two consecutive iterations
ALAR Absolute Latency to Amplitude Ratio
Table A.3: The frequency domain’s commonly computed features per a three-axis sensor. Adapted from [13, 19]
Feature Set Number of resulting features Description
Correlation coefficient 3 Relationship between two axes
Cosine similarity 3 Pairwise cosine similarity measurements between axes
Co-variance 3 Pairwise co-variances between axes
DTW 3 Dynamic Time Warping
Band Power 3 Dynamic Time Warping
SNR 3 Signal to Noise Ratio
Table A.4: Miscellaneous commonly computed features and number of resulting features per a three-axis sensor. Adapted
from [13, 19]
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A.4 Deep Feature Extractor Pare-meters
Figure A.8: Siamese Convolutional Neural Network architecture with 1D filters proposed by [16]. All filters use padding and
the vector of the last CNN layer (marked in green) is considered the deep feature representation. Adapted from [13]
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Figure A.9: Siamese Convolutional Neural Network architecture with FCN sub networks proposed by [15] as modeled after
[17]. All filters use padding and the vector of the last layer (marked in green) is considered the deep feature representation.
Adapted from [13]
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Figure A.10: Siamese Convolutional Neural Network architecture proposed by [16]. All filters use padding and the vector of
the last CNN layer (marked in green) is considered the deep feature representation. Adapted from [13]
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Parameter Value Comment
Train subjects 60 Separated from subjects used for
OCSVM.
Train observations 6750 Per subject, resulting in 270 samples
per subject.
Train samples 270 Per subject
Train pairs 8100 Implicitly given (60 · 270 ÷ 2). 50%
positive, 50% negative pairs.
CNN Layers 4 Conv., Max Pool. Convolutional layers and Max Pooling
layers are alternated.
Max Pooling 2x2
Conv. Layers 32(7x7), 64 (5x5),128
(3x3),22(3x3)
Filter number of last layer is deduced:
it is stated to be adjusted to result in a
∼64 dimensional output vector.
Distance Function Eucl. Dist. Euclidean distance.
Loss Contr.Loss Contrastive loss function
Table A.5: Siamese CNN parameters. Adapted from [20, 13]
Parameter Variations
CNN architecture CNN (2D filters), CNN (1D filters), FCN (1D filters)
Window size 0.5, 1, 2, 5 sec.
Sampling rate 100 Hz, 25 Hz
Body Modes {sit, walk}, {walk}, {sit}
Table A.6: Variations of parameters tested for Siamese CNN approach. Adapted from [13]
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A.5 Models
VAE [109] is the graphical Bayesian inference probabilistic variant of the Auto-Encoder.
As opposed to the Auto-Encoder where the encoder and decoder implement two comple-
mentary deterministic transformations, in VAE it is a distribution that is being learned
and the output is a draw from that underlying distribution. β-VAE [159] is a variation of
the VAE with the goal to discover disentangled latent factors. PCA (Principal Component
Analysis) [133] is a linear transformation often used for dimensional reduction to allow for
easy data exploration and analysis. OCSVM (One-class Support Vector Machine) [134]
is a linear algorithm that aims at learning a decision boundary to group the data points.
MCD (Minimum Covariance Determinant) [135] is an estimator of multivariate location
and scatter. HBOS (Histogram-based Outlier Score) [136] is a proximity based technique
that models uni-variate feature densities using histograms with a fixed or a dynamic bin
width. KNN (K-Nearest neighbors) [137] is a proximity based model where for each
data point, the whole data set is examined to extract the k data points with the most
similar feature values. LOF (Local Outlier Factor) [138] is a proximity based method
that captures exactly the relative degree of isolation of an object from its surrounding
neighborhood. CBLOF (Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor) [139] is a proximity based
method where the outlier score is computed by the distance of each instance of the data
to its respective cluster center multiplied by the instances belonging to its cluster. ABOD
(Angle-based Outlier Detection) [140] is a probabilistic Proximity based technique built
for high-dimensional data anomaly detection tasks. IForest (Isolation Forest) [141] is
an ensembling technique that is based on the usage of numerous isolation trees, a tree
structure constructed effectively to isolate every single instance. FeatureBag [142] is an
ensemble technique applying Feature Bagging for Outlier Detection.
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